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Executive Summary 
 
 
This Synthesis paper provides a structured overview of the main results of the 
six Country Papers produced under the study “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mo-
bility between the EU and the Eastern Partner Partnership Countries” for the 
European Commission (Contract No. 2011/270-312, tender procedure Eu-
ropeAid/130215/C/SER/Multi). The objective of the study, reflected in this paper, 
it to provide a thorough assessment of the costs and benefits of labour migration 
for the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP, comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), to explore the potential for future new rules 
on mobility with EU countries, and to provide policy recommendations to enhance 
the benefits stemming from such flows. 
EaP Migration: The “Three Stages” 
Labour migration has had, and continues to have, important effects on the 
economies and societies of the EaP countries, albeit with different features that 
reflect the economic trajectories of each country. Labour mobility was high within 
the Soviet Union, to which all countries belonged, and contributed to the for-
mation of large Diasporas, particularly in the Russian Federation, that have in 
many ways shaped post-independence developments. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union led to a period of chaotic economic dislocation and resettlement of people 
to reflect their national origins. This period lasted roughly through the mid-1990s, 
and coincided with the deep economic depression that all EaP countries experi-
enced (with output losses as high of 40 percent in the case of Armenia, or possibly 
even more as in the case of Moldova). 
Following this first wave of ethnically- and nationality-based migration, a se-
cond stage involved trade-based movements of people from the EaP, both towards 
the Russian Federation and increasingly towards the European Union. This gradu-
ally grew into large-scale labour migration, starting in the late 1990s and growing 
rapidly during the 2000s, the third stage of migration for the EaP countries. The 
scale of the phenomenon today is large, but difficult to measure with precision, 
particularly in view of the fact that many labour migrants do not have a legal status 
in the countries of destination.  
Most migrants from the Eastern Partnership countries are temporary mi-
grants in the sense that they continue to belong to a household in their home 
country even if they work abroad for a long time. Therefore, the number of 
these temporary migrants may be estimated through household surveys in the 
countries of origin. Based on these pieces of evidence, labour migration is far 
more widespread in the three smaller Eastern Partnership economies (Moldova, 
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Georgia, Armenia) than in oil-rich Azerbaijan (which has in fact become a net 
importer of labour), Belarus, or Ukraine. In Moldova (and probably in Georgia, 
too), migration was largely driven by deteriorating employment and income-
earning opportunities in rural areas. By contrast, the rapidly growing oil sector in 
Azerbaijan and urban centres in Belarus and Ukraine have attracted large number 
of internal migrants.  
Who are the Migrants? In terms of migrant gender and destination countries, 
there is a marked contrast between Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, on the one 
hand, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, on the other. Men account for the 
majority of migrants everywhere; however, their share ranges from 57 to 66 per-
cent in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, versus from 78 to 88 percent in the re-
maining countries. Similarly, Russia was home to 40 percent of Georgian mi-
grants, 64 percent of Moldovans, and 47 percent of Ukrainians, versus 74 percent 
of Armenian migrants, 77 percent of Azerbaijanis, and fully 90 percent of Belarus-
ians. Detailed analysis at the country level suggests that the differences in gender 
shares and destination countries reflect in part a substantial number of female mi-
grants from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in the European Union. Patterns of 
employment vary widely, from low-skilled manual work, especially in the con-
struction industry and agriculture, to the provision of long-term care, often in 
households. 
In addition to temporary labour migration, some countries are beginning to see 
permanent emigration of whole families, particularly to the EU. While temporary 
migration has peaked in the Eastern Partnership countries although it remains 
high, the available, scattered data from destination countries suggest that perma-
nent migration may gradually be taking hold. For example, through several ways 
of regularization, Italy had regularized 143,000 Moldovans and 218,000 Ukraini-
ans by 2011 (Marchetti et. At., 2012 (Country report Italy)). 
Remittances: A Powerful Social and Economic Agent of Change 
During the 2000s, migrant remittances in the EaP countries grew rapidly 
along with the number of migrants, mirroring a world-wide trend stimulated 
by increased migratory flows and better technologies for transfers of small 
sums of money. For the whole EaP region, remittances rose from practically neg-
ligible amounts in 1995 to US$12.9 billion in 2008. After a sharp decline in 2009 
because of the economic slump in Russia and other destination countries, they 
have recovered consistently, reaching a projected US$14.2 billion for 2012.  
Together with the rapid growth in nominal US$ terms, the macroeconomic im-
portance of remittances has increased, albeit less impressively because GDP in 
many Eastern Partnership countries also increased during the 2000s. Unsurprising-
ly, the smaller countries with higher levels of labour migration – Moldova, Arme-
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nia, and Georgia – are the most “dependent” on remittances (with the ratio of re-
mittances to GDP, respectively, at 23, 13 and 11 percent in 2011), whereas for 
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine remittances are below 5 percent of GDP. 
The growing importance of remittances has shaped several economic and 
social developments in all the EaP countries, which are discussed in more detail 
below. Remittances have had macroeconomic consequences (sustaining growth 
and consumption, but also possibly inducing Dutch Disease symptoms through 
higher relative prices for non-tradable goods and services. They have affected the 
lives of ordinary citizens—while typically migrants tend not to come from the 
ranks of the poorest individuals, ample evidence indicates that remittances have 
had an important role in reducing poverty and vulnerability in the EaP countries 
(as elsewhere in the world). Migration to Russia has played a key role in reducing 
poverty because the monetary cost of migrating there is little more than the price 
of a minibus or train ticket to Moscow; hence, migration to Russia is a viable op-
tion even for poor workers. By contrast, migration to the EU (which is frequently 
irregular) is typically much more costly and therefore available only to the rela-
tively well-off.  
Costs and Benefits of Migration for EaP Countries  
Assessing costs and benefits of migration is not an easy task, if only because of 
the lack of a generally accepted metric. Migration is a complex phenomenon, in-
volving clear economic dimensions (e.g., through the effects of remittances on 
consumption and investment patterns, the changes in the labour markets that are 
the result of the outflow of workers, the changes in relative prices of tradables and 
non-tradables) as well as non-economic ones (such as the resulting consequences 
on the social fabric of sending countries, the deadweight losses possibly caused by 
underemployment of skills). In this paper, we review several “building blocks” of 
the cost-benefit equation for the EaP countries, ranging from those that can be 
measured with some degree of precision, to those which are more qualitative in 
nature. 
More specifically, this study examines the evidence concerning individu-
al/household and macroeconomic effects. Among the first are the effects of the 
extra income on household behaviour; relatedly, the effects on professional skills, 
on the welfare of children and families left behind, on the relationships between 
genders and more generally on societal values. With respect to the second set of 
economy-wide consequences, we review the effects on labour markets and more 
generally on the possibility of Dutch disease outcomes; the repercussions on la-
bour markets, on the formation of human capital, and then on the functioning of 
financial markets and the impact on fiscal aggregates and public finance manage-
ment. 
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We conclude from our country studies that labour migration in the EaP 
countries generates large benefits for the migrants and their families as well 
as for economic and social development in migrants’ home countries. Many 
migrants from the EaP region look upon their work abroad as an employment op-
tion that implies additional hardship but allows them to save for future consump-
tion (durables, housing) or investment (children’s education, small enterprise) in 
their home country. Along the way, they may improve their professional skills, 
support community investment projects, or help develop financial intermediaries 
by placing some of their savings in financial institutions at home. The sooner these 
migrants attain their savings objective, the sooner they will return home for good. 
After discussing the available evidence, we can conclude with one important 
(and intuitive) finding, namely that the balance of the benefits and the costs is 
proportional to the importance of migration with respect to the size of the 
economy. Thus, for instance, in the case of Moldova it is quite apparent that there 
have been large benefits accruing to the macro-economy as well as to individual 
households. On the other hand, given the scale of the phenomenon, the costs (and 
associated risks) have also been large.  
At the opposite of the spectrum are instead countries such as Azerbaijan and 
Belarus, where the scale of migration and its economic effects are relatively mi-
nor, and hence the overall macroeconomic benefits are likely to be limited. How-
ever, costs and benefits of migration are not necessarily equally low for the house-
holds experiencing them – if not well addressed through public policies, they 
might in fact tip the balance of benefits and costs in a negative way. 
Review of evidence shows that costs and benefits can be altered by the adop-
tion of specific policies and the strengthening of institutions dealing with migra-
tion. This issue is addressed in the rest of this summary, after a brief review of the 
findings on the potential for future labour migration. 
The Potential for Future Labour Migration to the EU 
An issue of concern in the debate on possible changes to the migration ar-
rangements between the EU and the EaP countries is whether more liberal policies 
might induce uncontrolled or excessive flows, potentially disruptive of (segments 
of) receiving countries’ labour markets. Though recognizing all the difficulties 
involved in forecasting migration flows, this study attempts to obtain a baseline 
series of estimates of potential flows using a demographic approach. While the 
propensity to emigrate increased sharply in some EaP countries during the first 
half of the 2000s, it has been relatively constant throughout the region since then. 
In our simulations, we therefore assume initially that the propensity to emigrate 
for each age cohort of workers remains constant. Further taking into account the 
likely demographic trend in each EaP country, we use a simple model to project 
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the number of migrants from the EaP countries. On this basis, we then calculate 
the magnitude by which the propensity to migrate to the EU (as opposed to the 
Russian Federation) would have to change – for example, due to improved em-
ployment opportunities in the EU - in order to keep current migrant flows to the 
EU constant. 
These simulations show that the possibility of a major “flood” of migrants 
from EaP countries following the adoption of more liberal policies by the EU 
is rather remote. Even to maintain the current numbers unchanged would require 
substantial behavioural changes on the part of migrants from the largest migration-
sending countries. While this is not altogether impossible, one should also keep in 
mind that the Russian Federation is likely to continue to increase its own demand 
for migrants, and has good chances to become an even more attractive destination 
on its own. Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that the EU will be able to shift 
migrants’ preferences in large proportions; by the same token, the notion of large 
migratory flows towards the EU from the EaP countries can be discounted as high-
ly unlikely (barring of course the occurrence of severe negative socio-economic 
developments in the EaP countries). 
Improving Migration Outcomes: Win-Win Policies for Sending and Re-
ceiving Countries  
Migration involves significant risks. Migrants may fail to attain their savings 
objective or it may take longer than planned, straining family bonds. Migrants may 
also find living conditions in their host countries preferable to their home countries 
and move permanently with their families. With a view to enhancing the develop-
ment impact of migration, migration-related policy interventions in host as well as 
home countries should therefore be designed, above all else, to empower migrants 
to achieve their objectives as quickly and smoothly as possible. With this as a gen-
eral guideline, it is possible to identify a variety of distortions in the migration 
process where cost-effective interventions can be designed.  
The labour migration flows discussed in this study have taken place in an 
evolving institutional and legislative environment, both on the sending and the 
receiving country side. Policies and institutions have a potentially important role 
in determining the developmental outcomes of migration, or in affecting the bal-
ance of costs and benefits. The country studies for the Eastern Partnership 
countries demonstrate conclusively that some of the relevant policies are not 
migration-specific: overall economic stability and growth, financial sector devel-
opment, education, social protection, all affect the decisions of people to migrate 
and the way in which their efforts are translated into economic success or failure. 
Migration-specific policies and institutions, on the other hand, may have a 
powerful effect on incentives for forms of migration that are in the best inter-
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est of migrants, sending nations and receiving ones. A subset of these policies 
involves relations with Diasporas, and their contribution to the societies of origin. 
We summarize these lessons into the ones mostly relevant for sending countries, 
and those which could be taken up by the European Union and its member states. 
Furthermore, mainstreaming migration into all development-related policies 
will maximize the benefits from migration and remittances to sending country 
societies and economies, beyond migrants and their families. Higher living stand-
ards at home will also make it more likely that those migrants who originally in-
tended to work abroad only temporarily will in fact return.  
Lessons and Policy Recommendations for EaP Countries. General, macroe-
conomic and sectoral, policies affect the individual decisions to migrate and the 
potential for positive or negative outcomes. It is not feasible to list all possible 
ways in which these policies interact with migration, but it is possible to provide a 
general, methodological recommendation for the EaP countries going forward:  
A Migration Lens should be part of macroeconomic and sectoral policy formula-
tion 
This “lens”, i.e. framing policies with a view to direct and indirect consequenc-
es on migration should also become more important as the importance of migra-
tion rises. The need for an institutionalized “lens” is important, as experience 
shows that sectoral policy discussions very often are dominated by domestic con-
cerns and lobbying effort by different stakeholders, who may not be particularly 
interested in the nexuses with migration and its socio-economic effects. 
A complementary lesson is that: 
The Migration Lens needs to be implemented/facilitated by an agency empowered 
with sufficient clout among government organizations 
These two recommendations imply that migration should be recognized as part 
of the national strategy in the EaP countries, and that this recognition should be 
backed by an institutional setting that would favour its effectiveness. National 
development strategies for migration-sending countries would be well-advised to 
take a holistic approach to maximizing the benefits from labour migration flows, 
but this requires the existence of a powerful advocate that can help mediate among 
sectoral interests and maintain the focus on the migration strategy and on the im-
plications of individual policy decisions on migration outcomes. 
EaP countries are also at very different stages in the provision of migration-
targeted assistance, both pre- and post-departure. In this respect, the EaP govern-
ments could learn a lot from international best-practice in areas such as regulation 
of employment intermediaries, pre-departure education courses in languages, sur-
vival skills, financial literacy, as well as consular assistance in countries of desti-
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nation. Action in this respect would offer opportunities for joint work and collabo-
ration with the EU and its member states. 
Maximizing the benefits of the relations with the Diaspora. Diasporas form 
the EaP countries are very active in a number of EU member states, and have 
served both as informal social safety and informational networks for migrants, as 
well as purveyors of investment and knowledge towards the countries of origin. 
EaP countries have adopted very different models in dealing with the diaspora. We 
recommend that EaP governments, with possible assistance from the EU, evaluate 
the effectiveness of their present arrangements and, as part of the overall Migra-
tion Strategy, proceed to upgrade where necessary the institutional commitments 
to Diaspora collaboration. 
Recommendations for the European Union and its Member States. This 
study documents the ongoing array of instruments and avenues that are being pur-
sued by the institutions of the European Union to deal with migration issues con-
cerning the EaP countries. The study also notes the experience of the relationships 
between the EaP and the Russian Federation with regard to mobility of people and 
labour migration. In particular, it appears that visa liberalization would not lead to 
massive emigration. This is an important point to bear in mind in the present con-
text, when much energy is spent negotiating the fine details of visa facilitation and 
liberalization between the EaP countries and the EU. The second, however, is that 
even Russia has not managed to find, despite its many attempts and the clear focus 
on management of labour migration as a strategic objective for medium-term 
growth, a clear mechanism to reconcile the demand for labour (and of different 
types of skills) and the supply of migrants from the CIS countries. 
Many migrants from EaP countries live and work in EU member states irregu-
larly, frequently in problematic circumstances. National regularization pro-
grammes in several EU countries have already improved the living conditions of 
many of these migrants. However, as long as access to the EU labour market re-
mains highly restricted for individuals from the EaP region, incentives for irregu-
lar migration remain. The EU could consider, in the context of the EaP initiative, 
encouraging member countries to start pilot programs specifically targeted for EaP 
nationals for access to the labour force in EU countries. Greatly expanded legal 
employment opportunities in the EU would not only improve the living conditions 
of the migrants themselves. They would also generate a positive development 
impact in the EaP countries, particularly when combined with policy interventions 
that provide for pre-departure migrant orientation, language training, and job 
placement. By providing a structured environment for labour migration, it would 
also be possible to avoid labour market disruption in EU member states.  
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In the course of its present negotiations with some EaP countries, the EU has 
been conditioning progress in mobility arrangements to improvements in the legal 
and institutional framework in sending countries, dealing with migration issues. 
This approach is highly appropriate, and should be extended and provided with 
adequate means—as long as clear institutional benchmarks are clearly set and not 
seen as ways of postponing policy decisions on the part of the EU. 
A further lesson that emerges from this review is that the progress in bilateral 
negotiations on important aspects of labour migration frameworks (e.g., ranging 
from definition of workers’ rights, to arrangements for social security and health 
benefits, to education) is very slow, and limited to few of the EaP countries. As 
noted earlier, the implementation of the Single Permit Directive could simplify 
negotiations and provide a common platform for discussions regarding social se-
curity and other working conditions for migrants, which will likely require to be 
supplemented by other agreements (either to cover categories such as seasonal or 
temporary migrants, or to clarify the rules for recognition of contributions to dif-
ferent pension schemes, for instance). 
There is also still scope for the European Institutions to take leadership in areas 
in which the adoption of standards could allow for progress at the country level as 
well (most notably in the fields of higher and vocational education). 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is part of the project entitled “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility 
between the EU and the Eastern Partner Partnership Countries” for the European 
Commission (Contract No.2011/270-312, tender procedure EuropeAid/130215/ 
C/SER/Multi). It is based on the six Country Studies on Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as on existing literature on migra-
tion, both regional and general. It assesses the benefits and costs of labour migra-
tion to the EU from the point of view of Eastern Partnership countries, develops 
scenarios for future migrant flows, reviews the institutional and legal framework 
in place for labour migration, and discusses policy implications for both Eastern 
Partnership and EU countries. 
Since the EU is only one of several important destination regions for migrants 
from Eastern Partnership countries (the Russian Federation still being the most 
prominent), we consider migration to the EU within the broader context of total 
migrant flows from the Eastern Partnership Region.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of macroeconomic developments in the EaP re-
gion in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to the great 
financial crisis of 2008-9 and to current developments. In this context, it reviews 
labour market developments, and links them to the emergence of substantial la-
bour migration  
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of costs and benefits of labour migration for 
the EaP countries. Starting by laying out the conceptual framework for evaluating 
the many dimension of the socio-economic effects of migration on sending coun-
tries, the chapter reviews the available evidence for the EaP countries, distinguish-
ing between household-level and economy-wide effects. The chapter ends with a 
qualitative “scorecard” that tries to sum up the balance of benefits and costs, and 
argues that such balance is quite uneven across the EaP countries. 
Chapter 4 develops and discusses a methodology to assess the potential for fu-
ture labour migratory flows. The model uses existing demographic projections for 
the EaP countries and, on the basis of hypotheses about the propensity to engage 
in labour migration for given age cohorts, calculates the likely future flows, both 
for total migration as well as migration to the EU, in the absence of major eco-
nomic shifts. 
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Chapter 5 reviews the institutional and legislative framework in EaP countries 
with regard to migration in general and labour migration more specifically. The 
chapter also discussed the approaches to migration from the EaP countries now 
adopted by the Russian Federation, which is the largest recipient of labour mi-
grants from the region. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a series of forward looking policy recommenda-
tions for both EaP countries and the EU and its member states, aimed at maximiz-
ing the benefits from ongoing and future labour migration flows. 
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2. Macroeconomic and Labour 
Market Developments in the EaP 
Region: Common Origins, 
Diverging Paths 
This Chapter provides a bird’s eye view of socio-economic developments in 
the Eastern Partnership countries with a special focus on labour markets and the 
role of labour migration and remittances. While we cover the last two decades, we 
concentrate on the period since 2000 because it was then that (i) economic recov-
ery took hold throughout the region and (ii) labour migration became a mass phe-
nomenon. 
In terms of aggregate output and population, the Eastern Partnership countries 
are dominated by Ukraine. However, we review and compare individual country 
experiences, rather than focussing on regional aggregates, because greater cooper-
ation and economic integration with the EU will affect individual Eastern Partner-
ship countries in different ways. 
Throughout, this broad review of macroeconomic and labour market develop-
ments draws on the more detailed analyses in our Country Studies. We comple-
ment this broad review with a comparative, country-by-country discussion of the 
costs and benefits of labour migration and remittances in Section 3 below. 
 
 
2.1. The Macroeconomy: Collapse and Recovery  
 
Throughout the Eastern Partnership countries, output declined sharply when the 
Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 (Figure 1). Probable causes include the rapid 
breakdown of the central planning mechanism while market economy institutions 
took time to build; a demand shock as government procurement for many goods, 
including military hardware, were curtailed; and the disruption of trading rela-
tioships among the former Soviet republics. Further disruptions resulted from wars 
and an economic blockade that affected Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. 
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Recovery started during the mid-1990s in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and 
Georgia and continued through 2011, with a limited setback in 2009 due to the 
global financial crisis. By contrast, Moldova and Ukraine suffered prolonged stag-
nation during the mid-1990s and a further dip in output because of the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998. Here, recovery began around 2000 but has continued since 
then, with only a temporary setback in 2009. The drivers of the economic recovery 
differed across countries in terms of their relative importance; successful systemic 
transformation, higher commodity prices (especially in Ukraine and Azerbaijan), 
higher import demand from Russia, and growing inflows of migrant remittances 
have all contributed to varying degrees (Havrylyshyn, 2008). 
 
Figure 1. Eastern Partnership countries: GDP in constant prices, 1990 to 2011 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database; own calculation. 
 
Although the recovery was impressive in terms of its length and the rate of out-
put growth, total GDP in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia remains below its pre-
independence level. By contrast, GDP in Belarus has nearly doubled since 1990, 
although some doubts remain regarding the sustainability of the Belarusian growth 
model that is characterized by very extensive government intervention in the 
economy, continuing subsidies from Russia through low energy prices, and mac-
roeconomic distortions. Armenia’s GDP in 1990 was already much reduced by the 
devastating earthquake in 1988; this may explain the large increase in GDP during 
the 2000s. The economic boom in Azerbaijan is fuelled by a large increase in oil 
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and gas extraction. Overall, countries in the Region remain economically fragile, 
not least because of the uneven implementation of macroeconomic, structural, and 
systemic reforms (Havrylyshyn, 2006). 
Macroeconomic stability, measured in terms of consumer price inflation, was 
established in the region during the first half of the 1990s and has been maintained 
since then, except in Belarus. After independence, each country needed to set up 
its own currency and banking system, starting essentially from scratch. Annual 
inflation rates were in the hundreds and even thousands of percentage points in the 
early 1990s. However, inflation was brought down decisively through tight mac-
roeconomic policies and has been low ever since (Figure 2). While Belarus experi-
enced low inflation during most of the 2000s, sharply higher rates in 1999 and 
again in 2011 suggest that macroeconomic stability is less firmly established in 
Belarus than in the rest of the region.  
 
Figure 2. Eastern Partnership countries: GDP in constant prices, 1990 to 2011 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; own calculations. 
 
Private consumption declined less sharply than total GDP and recovered quick-
ly, beginning in the mid-1990s (Figure 3). This trend in consumption was accom-
panied by a declining investment ratio due to the transition shock as well as large 
trade deficits in most countries during the 1990s and 2000 (Figure 4). Trade defi-
cits were financed through a combination of international aid, foreign investment, 
and migrant remittances. 
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Figure 3. Eastern Partnership countries: Real household consumption 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; own calculations. 
 
Figure 4. Eastern Partnership countries: Net exports,1990 to 2011 (in constant local 
currency units, percent of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; own calculations. 
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The sharp decline in GDP in the early 1990s led to wide-spread, mostly hidden 
unemployment in all Eastern Partnership countries. Around this time, a first wave 
of migrants left the region, involving mostly ethnic Russians who returned to Rus-
sia permanently and maintained few links with their former homes. 
Later during the 1990s, “shuttle” traders began to take advantage of new oppor-
tunities to travel and the slow development of wholesale and retail trade networks. 
Travelling back and forth throughout Eastern Europe to buy goods that were cheap 
in one place and in short supply in another, carrying as much merchandise on them 
as they could physically handle, they effectively became a second wave of interna-
tional migration in the region. Their international movements were atypical in the 
sense that their main purpose was to physically move goods across borders, rather 
than to live or work in the host country. Nevertheless, in exposing a large number 
of people to a transnational way of life, shuttle trade was probably one important 
stepping stone to the subsequent emergence of networks of labour migrants. 
 
 
2.2. Labour Migration – In Search of Opportunities 
 
Labour migration from most Eastern Partnership countries started in the late 
1990s and grew rapidly during the 2000s. Many of these migrants reside and work 
in their host countries irregularly; therefore, there are no comprehensive data on 
the number of migrants or how it evolved over time (our Country Studies discuss 
data availability in detail). However, most migrants from the Eastern Partnership 
countries are temporary migrants in the sense that they continue to belong to a 
household in their home country even if they work abroad for a long time. There-
fore, the number of these temporary migrants may be estimated through household 
surveys in the countries of origin. Since the quality of available household surveys 
varied widely across countries and over time, the information in Figure 5 should 
be viewed as the best available estimate of the current number of temporary mi-
grants (i.e. those who still belong to a household in the country of origin), subject 
to considerable uncertainty. Since by all accounts the number of migrants abroad 
was very small in all Eastern Partnership countries as late as the year 2000, the 
information in Figure 5 also represents the accumulated net outflow of migrants 
over little more than one decade.  
Not surprisingly, labour migration is far more widespread in the three smaller 
Eastern Partnership economies (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia) than in oil-rich 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, or Ukraine (Figure 5). In Moldova (and probably in Georgia, 
too), migration was largely driven by deteriorating employment and income-
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earning opportunities in rural areas. Under the central planning system, the agri-
cultural sector had received huge subsidies directly and indirectly. After independ-
ence, the sector shrank and rural-to-urban migration followed. With few large 
urban areas to move to within the country (the Chisinau region is now performing 
well economically, but is relatively small relative to the rest of the country), rural-
to-urban migration naturally flowed to Russia (mostly Moscow) and increasingly 
to Italy and Spain (Luecke, Omar Mahmoud, Steinmayr, 2009). By contrast, the 
rapidly growing oil sector in Azerbaijan and urban centres in Belarus and Ukraine 
have attracted large number of internal migrants.  
 
Figure 5. Eastern Partnership countries: Migrant stocks relative to labour force, app. 
2010 (percent) 
 
Source: ENPI country reports. 
 
In terms of migrant gender and destination countries, there is a marked contrast 
between Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Armenia, Azerbai-
jan and Belarus, on the other (Synoptic Table 1). Men account for the majority of 
migrants everywhere; however, their share ranges from 57 to 66 percent in Geor-
gia, Moldova, and Ukraine, versus from 78 to 88 percent in the remaining coun-
tries. Similarly, Russia was home to 40 percent of Georgian migrants, 64 percent 
of Moldovans, and 47 percent of Ukrainians, versus 74 percent of Armenian mi-
grants, 77 percent of Azerbaijanis, and fully 90 percent of Belarusians. Detailed 
analysis at the country level suggests that the differences in gender shares and 
destination countries reflect in part a substantial number of female migrants from 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in the European Union. Patterns of employment 
vary widely, from low-skilled manual work, especially in the construction industry 
and agriculture, to the provision of long-term care, often in households. 
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In addition to temporary labour migration, some countries are beginning to see 
permanent emigration of whole families, particularly to the EU. While temporary 
migration has peaked in the Eastern Partnership countries although it remains 
high, the available, scattered data from destination countries suggest that perma-
nent migration may gradually be taking hold. For example, through several ways 
of regularization, Italy had regularized 143,000 Moldovans and 218,000 Ukraini-
ans by 2011 (Country Report Italy). 
The rapid growth in the number of migrants coincided with rapid wage growth 
in the Eastern Partnership countries (Figure 6). Average wages were extremely 
low in the year 2000 at US$33 to US$67; open and hidden unemployment were 
wide-spread (see Country Studies). These “push” factors – dire poverty at home - 
were clearly a key motive to migrate early in the process. Although average wages 
have since grown several times and now range from around US$ 250 to US$ 400, 
there is still a large enough difference to wages in Russia (especially Moscow) or 
the European Union to make migration an attractive employment option for many. 
This is especially true for low-skilled manual workers who may earn substantially 
less than the average wage at home but may find skills-appropriate employment in 
Russia or the European Union relatively easily. Also, for many temporary mi-
grants, the dollar wage at home compared with the dollar wage abroad is probably 
the main decision criterion for whether to migrate. Relative price levels in the 
home and host country matter less because many migrants limit their expenditures 
in the host country to the bare minimum needed for survival, while most of their 
households’ expenditures occur at home. 
Rapid wage growth was linked to the general economic recovery of the Eastern 
Partnership countries during the 2000s (see Figure 1 above). Thus it must have 
reflected several causes, including migration. The transition shock to output left 
much productive capacity underutilized and workers underemployed (Havry-
lyshyn, 2008). In this situation, migration reduced the domestic labour supply and, 
hence, downward pressure on wages, without affecting output. Furthermore, simu-
lations based on computable general equilibrium models suggest that when mi-
grant remittances began to flow in, they increased demand for domestic goods and 
services, including food and other labour-intensive items, and allowed output to 
recover (Luecke, 2011). 
In most countries, labour migration and wage growth took place against the 
background of a declining population and labour force (Figure 7). In Moldova and 
Belarus, the labour force declined rather faster than the population, reflecting the 
large number of labour migrants in Moldova and probably an aging population and 
mandatory retirement in Belarus. Azerbaijan differs from this pattern as it is the 
only country where the population grew strongly after 1990, along with an even 
more rapidly growing labour force. Thus it appears that the expansion of the oil 
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and gas sector and the resulting growth in demand for non-tradable goods and 
services have not only fuelled wage growth (Figure 6), but have also led to higher 
employment. 
 
Figure 6. Eastern Partnership countries: Average monthly wage, 2000 to 2010 (con-
stant 2000 US dollar) 
 
Source: Country reports; IMF International Financial Statistics database; own calculations. 
 
Figure 7. Population and Labour Force 
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2.3. Remittances: the Emergence of a Powerful Economic Force 
 
Apart from directly reducing the labour supply and exerting upward pressure 
on wages, labour migration affects the countries of origin through the remittances 
sent by migrants to their domestic household members. For migrant households, 
remittances are typically a major source of income (unsurprisingly, since one adult 
is employed abroad rather than at home). If migrant households are poor, the extra 
income due to migration will help to reduce poverty (see Section 3.2.1 below for a 
detailed discussion of these effects)2. 
In several Eastern Partnership countries, remittances are large enough to affect 
not only migrant households, but macroeconomic developments as well. During 
the 2000s, migrant remittances grew rapidly along with the number of migrants. 
Balance of payments statistics provide the best available data source on remittanc-
es since 2005, broken down by recipient countries (Figure 8). While strictly com-
parable data are not available before 2005, it is clear that migrant remittances were 
very small in all Eastern Partnership countries before 2000. Remittances to the 
Eastern Partnership region rose rapidly to nearly US$ 13 billion in 2008, with 
Ukraine accounting for the lion’s share at almost US$ 7 billion. In 2009, remit-
tances declined sharply because of the economic slump in Russia and other desti-
nation countries. Since then, they have rebounded to nearly US$ 15 billion in 
2011.  
Remittances are sent through formal (banks, Money Transfer Operators) as 
well as informal channels (minibus drivers, friends). Remittances through formal 
channels generate additional demand for banking services and thus promote finan-
cial sector development (see Section 3.1.5 for a more detailed analysis). 
While remittances grew rapidly in nominal US$ terms, their ratio to broad mac-
roeconomic aggregates has also increased considerably (Fig. 9), particularly in the 
smaller countries with larger labour migration – Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia – 
where the ratios of remittances to GDP rose to 23 percent, 13 percent, and 11 per-
cent, respectively. For the three larger countries, with lower incidence of migra-
tion, this ratio is below 5 percent. 
                                                 
2 There is an abundant literature on the relationship between remittances and economic 
growth or poverty reduction. See for instance Adams (2010); Adams, Richard H Jr. and 
John Page (2005); Brown, S.S. (2006); Barajas, A., R. Chami, C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen& 
P. Montiel (2009); Lopez-Cordova, E. and A. Olmedo (2006). 
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Figure 8. Eastern Partnership countries: Migrant remittances, 2005 to 2011 (million 
US dollar) 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics database; own calculations. 
 
With remittance inflows as high as in the smaller countries, rapidly growing 
remittances during the 2000s must have helped to sustain the growth of household 
consumption (Figure 3) as well as output growth in non-tradable goods and ser-
vices and ultimately GDP growth (Figure 1). Due to the output collapse in the 
early 1990s, capacity utilization was low in many industries around 2000. When 
household demand increased due to remittances, output was able to recover quick-
ly even though investment picked up only during the late 2000s. 
The flip side of the coin of higher demand for non-tradable goods and services 
is the risk of a Dutch disease. A Dutch disease is said to be present when essential-
ly temporary international inflows increase demand for domestic (“non-tradable”) 
goods and services relative to internationally traded goods. Higher prices for non-
tradables (including wages) will hurt the competitiveness of the tradable goods 
sector (exports and import-competing goods), ultimately causing this sector to 
shrink while the non-tradable sector expands. If foreign exchange inflows are 
volatile or temporary, this sectoral shift in output could be an impediment to future 
growth. The large increase in US dollar-denominated wages in Eastern Partnership 
countries (Figure 6) indeed raises the question of whether the combination of mi-
grant remittances with other international inflows (aid, investment, oil export rev-
enues) has hurt the competitiveness of exports. 
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Figure 9. Eastern Partnership countries: Migrant remittances, 2005 to 2011 (percent 
of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics database; own calculations. 
 
Real effective exchange rates are the most comprehensive measure available of 
the competitiveness of exports and import-competing goods. The evolution of real  
effective exchange rates in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine suggests 
that, at worst, the three smaller countries may have contracted a mild case of 
Dutch disease (Figure 10). While their real exchange rates did not change much 
during the first half of the 2000s, the second half of the decade saw a real appre-
ciation by approximately 30 percent. This modest appreciation implies that the 
much faster growth in US dollar-denominated wages was largely due to productiv-
ity increases (which, in turn, may have been the result of better capacity utilization 
as well as technological change). At US$ 250 to US$ 350 in 2010, the average 
monthly wage in Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia was still modest compared to 
the rest of Eastern Europe. It would seem far-fetched to argue at this point that the 
competitiveness of the tradable goods sector is threatened by high wages. Fur-
thermore, the recovery of remittances since 2009 demonstrates that even in a glob-
al crisis, remittances are neither temporary nor particularly volatile. 
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Figure 10. Real Effective Exchange Rates for EaP Countries 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Database; own calculations. 
 
Overall, this broad review of labour market and macroeconomic developments 
suggests that labour migration and migrant remittances were crucial to the eco-
nomic well-being of many households in the Eastern Partnership countries. At the 
aggregate level, migrant remittances were particularly important in the smaller, 
high-migration countries where they amounted to 11 percent of GDP in Georgia, 
13 percent in Armenia, and 23 percent in Moldova. Remittances contributed to 
rising demand for non-tradable goods and services and, hence, to the recovery of 
GDP since 2000. Emigration reduced downward pressure on wages when unem-
ployment was high and sustained the subsequent rapid growth in wages. While 
most migrants still work in Russia, EU member states, especially in Southern Eu-
rope are increasingly important destinations. 
 
Table 1. Structural features of labour migration in Eastern Partnership countries 
  Armenia Azerbai-jan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Migrants: total 
number (ths) 211 307 201 425 317 1309 
Share in popula-
tion 15/64 (per-
cent) 
10 5 3 14 12 4 
Share in labour 
force (percent) 15 7 4 18 26 6 
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  Armenia Azerbai-jan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Recent migra-
tion trend  
Country 
now a net 
immigra-
tion desti-
nation.  
 
EU replac-
ing Russia 
as the most 
important 
migration 
destina-
tion. 
Total 
number of 
temporary 
migrants 
broadly 
constant 
since 2007
Net migra-
tion to the 
EU ap-
proximate-
ly 30 thou-
sand peo-
ple/year 
Remittances: 
share in GDP 
(percent) 
12 3 1 7 22 4 
Destination 
countries (per-
cent of migrants) 
Russia: 74 
EU: 4 
Russia: 77 
EU: 1 
Russia: 90 
EU: 4 
Russia: 40 
EU: 35 
Russia: 64 
EU: 21 
Russia: 47 
EU: 44 
Migrants: % 
male 78 85 88 57 64 66 
Migrants: educa-
tion level, % 
with tertiary 
education 
 
 10-15% 
(in total 
employ-
ment: 
21%) 
26% 
(in total 
employ-
ment 24%)
15% 
among  
migrants to 
Russia, 
42% 
among 
migrants to 
EU, 18% 
overall (in 
total em-
ployment: 
25.4%) 
33% 
(in total 
employ-
ment 29%)
7% among 
migrants to 
Russia, 
16% 
among 
migrants to 
EU, 10% 
migrants 
overall.  
(in total 
employ-
ment: 
23.7%) 
13% over-
all 
(in total 
employ-
ment 34%) 
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3. Benefits and Costs of Migration 
and Remittances 
This section uses the migration profiles in our Country Studies to compare 
country experiences with labour migration and remittances and to assess the bene-
fits and costs of migration. We focus on the impact of large-scale labour migration 
since the late 1990s which still affects the economies of the Eastern Partnership 
countries and is itself affected by immigration policies in destination countries 
including the European Union. Throughout this section, information is drawn from 
our Country Studies unless otherwise indicated3. 
 
Graph 1. Potential costs and benefits of migration and remittances: overview 
 
Note. Numbers refer to corresponding sections in the text. 
                                                 
3 For a framework to assess costs and benefits of migration, see Barbone and Debalen 
(2009); Katseli, Louka, Robert E.B. Lucas and Theodora Xenogiani (2006); Ratha, Mo-
hapatra and Scheja (2011). 
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Although the number of labour migrants grew rapidly in all Eastern Partnership 
countries from the late 1990s until the late 2000s, the individual countries differ in 
terms of the size of the migrant outflow relative to the economically active popula-
tion, the relative weight of different destination countries, and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of migration. Accordingly, the economic and social impact of mi-
gration and remittances on these economies differs, too. At the same time, not all 
possible effects in all Eastern Partnership countries have been explored through 
systematic studies. Therefore, we review the available evidence and discuss how 
findings for a particular effect in a particular country may be applicable to other 
countries.  
This chapter is organized along the possible benefits and costs of migration and 
remittances (Graph 1). The literature generally shows that the balance of costs and 
benefits is not easily calculated, in view of the complexity and ramification of the 
phenomenon. In this paper, we distinguish broadly between welfare effects at two 
levels: first, at the aggregate level where macroeconomic effects may arise, for 
instance, through the effect of remittances on growth of GDP, consumption, and 
on the relative demand for non-tradables; and also through decline in total labour 
supply, and lower contributions to social security systems (Section 3.1); and se-
cond, at the individual or household level where remittances are received while 
migrants are separated from the remaining household members for prolonged pe-
riods (Section 3.2). For every possible effect, we first explain its economic impli-
cations, then consider the available empirical evidence on its relevance, and finally 
discuss the applicability of available empirical findings to other Eastern Partner-
ship countries. 
 
 
3.1. Aggregate and macroeconomic effects 
 
3.1.1. Labour market effects 
 
The current wave of labour migration from the Eastern Partnership countries 
started during the late 1990s when labour markets were characterized by very low 
wages (Figure 6) and high unemployment (both hidden and open). “Old” jobs 
were disappearing faster than “new” service sector jobs could be created. In this 
situation, labour migrants were able to quickly move into gainful employment by 
working abroad. Thereby, they helped to eliminate excess labour supply at home, 
reducing downward pressure on wages. The productivity of workers who remained 
at home increased sharply as output grew and hidden unemployment was gradual-
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ly eliminated: In all Eastern Partnership countries except Azerbaijan, GDP grew 
rapidly during the 2000s (Figure 1) even while the labour force declined (Figure 
7). The implied growth in labour productivity supported the observed growth in 
real wages.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, labour migration and the resulting reduction in ex-
cess labour supply and hidden unemployment were only one reason for the general 
economic recovery in the Eastern Partnership countries. It is difficult to assess the 
role of labour migration in this process relative to other determinants. In Moldova, 
labour migration played a large role because it was the only way in which many 
former agricultural workers could find gainful employment at all. Although the 
service sector around the capital (Chisinau) expanded and industrial employment 
held up well, the large number of underemployed agricultural workers made it 
impossible to generate enough “new” jobs within the country (Luecke, Omar 
Mahmoud, Steinmayr, 2009). By contrast, in a large economy like Ukraine, more 
of the rural-to-urban shift in employment could take place within the country. 
In sum, by reducing the excess labour supply, labour migration contributed to 
the observed wage growth in the Eastern Partnership countries and thus benefited 
not only migrants and their families, but all workers in the countries of origin.  
 
3.1.2. Brain drain or brain gain 
 
The labour market effects of migration depend not only on the total number of 
migrants, but also on the skill composition of migrants relative to workers staying 
behind. The debate about a migration-induced “brain drain” goes back originally 
to immigration policies in some rich countries that gave privileged access to cer-
tain skilled professions such as medical personnel. There was concern that such 
privileged access would lead to critical shortages of physicians and nurses in the 
countries of origin. This was considered especially problematic if the professional 
training of migrant medical personnel had been paid for by the residents of the 
country of origin. Given these possible risks, it is reassuring that a comprehensive 
study by the European Training Foundation (Bardak et al., 2011) finds no strong 
evidence so far that economic development in the Eastern Partnership countries 
has been constrained by a lack of human capital. 
Labour migration from the Eastern Partnership countries is not focussed on a 
small number of highly skilled professional groups (cf. Section 3.1.2). However, a 
brain drain in a broader sense may still occur if migrants are more highly educated 
on average than the economically active population. In this case, the ratio of high-
skilled to low-skilled workers in the country of origin declines, putting downward 
pressure on the relative wage of low-skilled workers. On the other hand, if most 
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migrants are low-skilled, the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers increases, 
along with the relative wage of low-skilled workers. 
In most Eastern Partnership countries, migrants are on average less educated 
(measured by years of education) than the labour force overall. Therefore, a brain 
gain (defined as an increase in the average level of formal education in the country 
of origin) is a more likely outcome than a brain drain (Synoptic Table 1). 
However, migrants in the EU tend to be better educated than those in other des-
tination countries, especially Russia. This observation probably reflects higher 
access barriers to the EU labour markets: Networks of migrants from Eastern Part-
nership countries in the EU are still thinner than in Russia. In the past, many mi-
grants entered EU labour markets in an irregular manner, which imposed large 
costs on migrants and their families; these costs naturally could be borne more 
easily by those migrants who were better educated and, therefore, relatively richer, 
to start with. Finding and maintaining employment in the EU and obtaining regu-
lar status when possible also require migrants to integrate into an environment that 
they are likely to find more challenging in terms of language and culture than Rus-
sia, again giving an advantage to better-educated migrants.  
If the formal education level of migrants to the EU is also higher than in the la-
bour force overall (this may be the case in Belarus, but not in Moldova: Table 1), 
migration to the EU may reduce the average education level in the domestic labour 
force, implying a brain drain. Future regularization programs in EU member states 
for currently irregular migrants, more extensive migrant networks in the EU over 
time, and more legal migration opportunities for all skill groups will all serve to 
reduce access barriers to the EU labour market. To the extent to which additional 
migration opportunities are taken up by less-skilled workers, the risk of brain drain 
will decline. At the same time, enhanced legal employment opportunities may 
make it easier for skilled workers to find work that is commensurate with their 
skills, rendering migration more attractive to them overall.  
 
3.1.3. The Dutch Disease: Higher Demand for Domestic (“non-tradable”) 
Goods and Services 
 
Like other foreign exchange inflows such as resource export revenues or exter-
nal aid, higher remittances may lead to a real appreciation of the domestic curren-
cy, reduced competitiveness of manufactured exports and import-competing 
goods, and an expansion of the non-tradables sector. The underlying mechanism 
has been called the “Dutch disease” to indicate that (i) an over-extended non-
tradables sector may render an economy vulnerable to external shocks if foreign 
exchange inflows are volatile; (ii) the shrinkage of manufacturing industry (the 
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core of the tradables sector) may decrease economic growth in the long run if in-
centives for human capital formation deteriorate permanently.  
In order to assess the relevance of this possible effect in the Eastern Partnership 
countries, it is useful to recall the underlying mechanism: 
Higher remittances increase household incomes. 
Households typically spend extra income on both tradable and non-tradable goods.  
Extra demand for tradable goods can be met through imports, whereas extra de-
mand for non-tradables must be met through additional domestic produc-
tion.  
If full employment prevails, the output of non-tradables can only grow if factors of 
production are shifted from the tradables to the non-tradables sector. If un-
employment and capacity underutilization prevail initially (like in the 
Eastern Partnership countries after the transition shock of the early 1990s 
and the 1998 Russian financial crisis), the output of non-tradables may 
grow without a shift of factors of production or a decline in tradables out-
put. 
If factors of production have to shift, the prices of non-tradable goods and services 
(including wages) must increase relative to tradables to generate an incen-
tive for the reallocation of inputs. This is equivalent to a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency.  
Thus we end up with a larger non-tradables sector and a smaller and less competi-
tive tradables sector. In addition, if the tradables sector (for instance, agri-
culture) is more labour-intensive than the non-tradables, and releases 
manpower at a higher rate than the absorption elsewhere, unemployment 
may increase, or incentives to migrate may increase. 
The latter point may lead to the “Curse of Unmanaged Remittance Flows” (Figure 
11), whereas incentives to increase migration may feed over the apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate. 
Is there evidence of Dutch Disease for the EaP countries? As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, time series for the real effective exchange rate are only available for four 
Eastern Partnership countries. The small, high-emigration countries (Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova) saw their currencies appreciate in real terms by approximately 
30 percent during the second half of the 2000s; however, there was no clear trend 
during the first half of the 2000s. This observation is consistent with the notion 
that when remittances began to grow during the early 2000s, the additional de-
mand for non-tradables was initially met by utilizing existing productive capacity 
(including underemployed workers) more fully. The resulting gains in labour 
productivity contributed to the rapid recovery of wages (Figure 6). Only when 
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further expansion of the non-tradables sectors required significant investment did 
the prices of non-tradables increase (i.e. did the currencies appreciate in real 
terms) to generate the required incentives for reallocating inputs. 
 
Figure 11. The Possible Curse of Unmanaged Remittance Flows  
 
 
By contrast, Ukraine’s real effective exchange rate did not change much 
throughout the 2000s, probably reflecting the relatively smaller role of remittances 
in the economy (Figure 9).  
Overall, the real appreciation of the currencies of the smaller, high-emigration 
countries since 2005 suggests that further growth of remittances in these countries 
could create Dutch-disease-style tensions in the future. This concern is supported 
by the extent of structural change towards non-tradables in Georgia and Moldova 
(though not Armenia), represented here by the share of services in GDP (Figure 12). 
In all Eastern Partnership countries except Azerbaijan (where the increase in oil 
output dwarfed all other trends), the service share has increased substantially, as 
one would expect given the underdeveloped state of many services under the cen-
tral planning system. However, a service share of around 75 percent as in Georgia 
and Moldova makes these economies very dependent indeed on continuing in-
flows of remittances at an elevated level to sustain demand for services. 
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Figure 12. Eastern Partnership countries: Service sector share in GDP, 1990 to 2011 
(percent) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; own calculations. 
 
Against this background, it is reassuring that remittances to the Eastern Part-
nership countries have proven to be quite robust during the recent global financial 
crisis. Although they took a hit in 2009, by 2011 they had regained their previous 
level in all countries except Moldova (where they also recovered markedly; Figure 
8). Since large swings in foreign exchange inflows, including remittances, may 
destabilize small economies in particular, we discuss possible strategies for steri-
lized foreign exchange interventions to limit such effects in Chapter 5. 
 
3.1.4. Fiscal Effects 
 
Some observers have expressed concern about the fact that temporary migrants 
or their household members use certain public services and receive transfers in 
their countries of origin, but usually do not pay income or payroll taxes on their 
remittances. Potentially, this could amount to free-riding by relatively well-off 
migrant households on their less-well-to-do neighbours. As a result, some Eastern 
Partnership countries such as Ukraine have attempted ineffectively to tax remit-
tances, mostly driving them underground, while others such as Moldova have re-
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nounced any attempt to tax remittances and have worked (with some success) to 
channel remittances through official rather than informal channels (Luecke, Omar 
Mahmoud, Pinger, 2007, p.49).  
While the argument about potential free-riding deserves to be taken seriously, it 
also needs to be put into perspective. First, income taxes make up only a small 
proportion of tax revenues in the Eastern Partnership countries. Taxes on con-
sumption and on imports – value added tax, excises, duties – are typically more 
important sources of government revenue. The surge in remittances has resulted in 
a similar surge in consumption and in imports, along with associated taxes (Singer, 
2012).  
Second, when assessing the overall fiscal effects of migration in the country of 
origin, it is worth noting that the loss of tax revenue is not the amount of income 
and payroll tax that would be due on the remittances paid. Rather, it is the amount 
of tax that the migrant would pay had she remained at home. This revenue loss 
needs to be weighed against higher revenues from taxes on imports which are 
fuelled by remittances. Available studies find that the balance is usually positive 
for the country of origin (Singer, 2012). 
Third, regular migrants pay income and payroll taxes in their host countries. It 
would be neither fair nor feasible to tax migrants’ incomes twice by attempting to 
tax remittances. At the same time, bilateral agreements between origin and desti-
nation countries might give migrants the option of contributing to the pension 
system in the country where they expect to spend their old age.  
Finally, although some migrants do not pay income or payroll taxes on their 
foreign income, many migrants nevertheless make donations for community pro-
jects at home (Luecke, Omar Mahmoud, 2012). Encouraging more migrants to 
support community projects through appropriate diaspora policies seems a promis-
ing approach to increasing their contribution to the provision of public goods at 
home. 
 
3.1.5. Financial Sector Development 
 
Remittances may be transferred from host to origin countries through a wide 
variety of channels, including formal ones like bank transfers and money transfer 
operators, informal service providers (e.g. minibus drivers), and personal transfers 
by migrants themselves, relatives, or friends. In many Eastern Partnership coun-
tries, formal channels, especially money transfer operators, now predominate. 
While globally active operators still charge relatively high fees, specialized opera-
tors in some migration corridors (especially those to Russia) offer much lower 
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rates, allowing migrants to capture the advantages of formal channels in terms of 
security and speed (Cantarji, Vasile and Georgeta Mincu (2013, Moldova Country 
Study), p.49). By contrast, informal transfers remain attractive especially for ir-
regular migrants who do not wish to submit identification when making a transfer. 
Personal transfers are convenient enough but assume that somebody trusted is 
visiting the country of origin at the right time (Siegel, Luecke, 2013). 
While formal financial institutions now play a large role in the international 
transfer of remittances, our Country Studies for Armenia and Moldova show that 
they are only beginning to take advantage of their position to offer targeted finan-
cial services to recipients. Receiving remittances potentially creates a strong incen-
tive for households to set up a bank account and use other financial services. For 
banks in Moldova, access to potential customers is facilitated by the fact that mon-
ey transfer operators cannot set up their own offices to interact with retail custom-
ers directly, but have to work through commercial bank. 
Moldovan households with migrants are indeed more likely to own a bank ac-
count than households without migrants; however, at 12 percent vs. 8 percent in 
2008, the difference is not large, leaving many households with or without mi-
grants unbanked (Luecke, Omar Mahmoud, Steinmayr, 2009). This is remarkable 
because 29 percent of households with migrants vs. only 8 percent of households 
without migrants owned monetary savings of more than USD 500 in any form, 
including cash (Cantarji, Vasile and Georgeta Mincu (2013, Moldova Country 
Study), p.50. Coupé, Tom and Hanna Vakhitova (2013, Ukraine Country Study) 
p.17, explain how the wide-spread scepticism towards financial institutions dates 
back to the early 1990s when individual savings accounts accumulated during the 
Soviet period were practically wiped out by hyperinflation. 
 
 
3.2. Individual and Household-Level Effects 
 
3.2.1. Use of Extra Income 
 
Labour migration from the Eastern Partnership countries is mostly temporary in 
the sense that individual household members work abroad, possibly for many 
years, while other household members remain in the country of origin. Relatively 
few complete households move abroad permanently (Chapter 2). Our Country 
Studies show that migrants remit mostly to members of their own households and 
to a lesser degree to other close relatives. There is also evidence that in Georgia 
remittances have resulted in more gifts by migrant households, suggesting a desire 
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to strengthen social capital (Labadze and Tukhashvili (2013, Georgia Country 
Study), p.41). Similarly, in Moldova, collective remittances – i.e. contributions to 
community projects, the Church, etc. – have played a significant role (Luecke, 
Omar Mahmoud, 2012). 
Theories of migration have identified many possible motives why the members 
of a household may decide that one of them will seek work abroad (for a survey 
see De Haas, 2008). For our present purposes, we may view the decision to mi-
grate as an investment decision where higher annual net income (after subtracting 
any extra expenditures related to living abroad) is balanced against the initial 
monetary cost of migration and against the loss in the quality of life due to the 
migrant being separated from her family. In this framework, worsening conditions 
at home (“push factors”) as well as improving access to higher-income employ-
ment opportunities abroad (“pull factors”) may cause labour migration. In addition 
to increasing the expected level of income over time, migration may allow a 
household to diversify its sources of income, effectively providing insurance 
against the volatility of other income sources, for example, farm income (Stark, 
Bloom, 1985).  
The available information for all Eastern Partnership countries suggests that 
poverty at home is the most important motive for labour migration. Accordingly, 
migrant households spend the extra income due to migration primarily on con-
sumption (especially food), housing (repair, construction, purchase), and human 
capital formation (education and health care expenses). Hence, labour migration in 
the Eastern Partnership countries reduces poverty among those households that 
receive remittances. 
Since many migrant households in the Eastern Partnership countries are poor, it 
is not surprising that only a small share of the extra income is apparently saved or 
invested in farms or other small businesses. Some studies find that more migrant 
households than non-migrant households surpass some threshold level of mone-
tary savings (Cantarji and Mincu (2013, Moldova Country Study), p.50). Howev-
er, the number of migrant households investing remittances in business is quite 
small. To explain low business investment, our Country Studies point to the high 
cost of doing business in the Eastern Partnership countries. Start-up firms are sub-
ject to extensive rent-seeking behaviour by various bureaucracies whose cost easi-
ly becomes prohibitive, especially for those would-be migrant entrepreneurs who 
are not well-connected to influential individuals (Luecke, Omar Mahmoud, Stein-
mayr, 2009). 
How should the lack of savings and business investment out of remittances af-
fect our assessment of the overall benefits and costs of labour migration and remit-
tances? It is worth bearing in mind that this is no welfare loss due to migration, 
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relative to a default scenario of no migration. Rather, limited investment may be 
regarded as a potential benefit foregone. Overall, then, we may conclude that the 
extra income due to migration and remittances reduces poverty in remittance-
receiving households throughout the Eastern Partnership countries, leading to bet-
ter nutrition, housing, and access to education and health care. So far, however, 
there is little evidence of additional benefits such as higher monetary savings or 
additional business investment. 
 
3.2.2. Professional Skills 
 
A prolonged stay abroad may impact upon migrants’ professional skills in sev-
eral ways. On the one hand, migration may offer employment opportunities to 
those with specialized skills that may not be available in the country of origin. 
Working abroad may also expose migrants to advanced technologies, unfamiliar 
management methods, and a foreign language, allowing migrants to acquire new 
skills. 
On the other hand, migrants with medium or high professional skills may not 
find employment abroad that is commensurate with their skills. They may not pos-
sess necessary professional licences; they may lack complementary (such as lan-
guage) skills; or their formal skills are simply not in demand in the host country 
labour market (nor, possibly, in the country of origin). By working outside their 
professional field, they may miss out on relevant work experience to the point where 
they may find it difficult to return to higher-skilled jobs in their home country. 
In assessing how skill gains and losses at the individual level affect the overall 
benefits and costs of migration, it is helpful to note that the migrants themselves 
have already decided to migrate. Unless they have miscalculated (in which case 
they will probably return home sooner or later), they have shown their preference 
for a lower-skilled but better-paid job over whatever job they could hold at home. 
Hence from an individual point of view, any possible loss of skills must be more 
than compensated for by income gains or other benefits of migration. We discuss 
the economy-wide implications of a possible brain-drain or brain-gain in Section 
3.2.2 below.  
Our Country Studies find that migrants from Eastern Partnership countries are 
on average lower-skilled than the labour force at home. Specifically, in all coun-
tries where data are available, the share of workers with higher education is lower 
among migrants than in total employment (Synoptic Table 1). Evidence from 
Ukraine and Moldova suggests that this may reflect in part the lack of suitable 
employment opportunities abroad for high-skilled workers (Coupé and Vakhitova 
(2013, Ukraine Country Study)), table 10/ p.41; Cantarji and Mincu (2013, Mol-
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dova Country Study), Table 10/ p.52. In Ukraine, characteristically, the highest-
skilled category of workers (“professionals, engineers, and technical staff”) ac-
counted for only 6 percent of migrants in 2008, compared with 35 percent of total 
employment. Of those migrants who were in the “professionals, etc.” category in 
Ukraine, only 23 percent were in the same high-skilled occupational category 
abroad. Everyone else shifted down to varying degrees; 32 percent even ended up 
in the lowest category (“simplest professions”). By contrast, workers in “simplest 
professions” in Ukraine accounted for 33 percent of migrants vs. only 25 percent 
of total employment; “qualified workers with instruments” in Ukraine supplied 38 
percent of migrants, but made up only 13 percent of total employment. In both 
groups, about two thirds of migrants were in the same occupation category at 
home and abroad.  
These observations demonstrate that high-skilled migrants from Eastern Part-
nership countries may indeed face skill downgrading. However, the overall impact 
of such downgrading is limited by the fact that relatively few high-skilled workers 
choose to migrate. One exception is Georgia where highly educated workers make 
up an unusually high 33percent of migrants (Synoptic Table 1) while also facing 
high unemployment at home (Labadze and Tukhashvili (2013, Georgia Country 
Study), p.20). Therefore, it is very likely that any skills that these Georgian mi-
grants cannot put to use abroad would not be gainfully employed at home, either. 
Furthermore, our Georgia and Armenia (p.17) Country Studies point to misguided 
education policies that generate an over-supply of graduates with administrative 
skills while neglecting technical vocational training. Overall, therefore, it seems 
unlikely that Georgian migrants are losing economically valuable skills by work-
ing abroad below their formal qualifications. 
 
3.2.3. Impact on Children Left Behind 
 
Temporary migration often implies the long-term absence of a child’s mother 
or father, with contact mostly through telephone or Skype calls and once-annual 
visits. Observers have suspected that the absence of a parent deprives the left-
behind child of crucial aspects of family life and parental guidance and thus puts 
the child’s development at risk (Salah, 2008). Anecdotal evidence (especially at 
the level of reports in mass media: New York Times, 2012) suggests that some 
children are indeed facing special challenges due to the absence of their mother or 
both parents (Coupé and Vakhitova (2013, Ukraine Country Study): p.60; Cantarji 
and Mincu (2013, Moldova Country Study): p.53; Bélorgey, 2012, p.113 4, sum-
marizing evidence from several Eastern Partnership countries). However, few 
studies systematically diagnose developmental issues and compare children with 
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migrant parents to those without, thus accounting also for the poverty-reducing 
effects of remittances. 
Preliminary findings from one recent, large representative survey in Moldova 
provide only limited evidence of negative effects of migration on children left 
behind (Luecke, Stoehr, 2012). This study analyses the determinants of child well-
being through various outcomes linked to education (grades and enrolment ratios), 
physical health, and social integration. One important finding is that education 
outcomes tend to be worse for those children whose mother is not their primary 
caregiver, unless the mother is a migrant (in which case there is a small positive 
net effect). This finding suggests that if the mother is absent from the child’s life 
due to reasons beyond her choosing (death, illness, etc.), then the child is likely to 
experience distress that will affect her educational performance. However, typical-
ly, parents will only decide to migrate if there is a well-functioning caregiving 
arrangement in place (grandmother, father, etc.). In addition, many migrant moth-
ers maintain regular (often daily) contact with their children even when they are no 
longer the primary caregiver.  
Another important finding from the Moldovan is that boys from households 
with migrants in Eastern Europe are significantly less likely to be enrolled in edu-
cation beyond the age of 15 than boys from non-migrant households. There is no 
similar effect for girls in households with a migrant in Eastern Europe; both boys 
and girls in households with migrants in Western Europe are more likely to be 
enrolled in education than their peers from households without migrants. This 
finding demonstrates that relatively easy access to low-skilled jobs abroad through 
family members’ networks may be a disincentive for some young people to pursu-
ing further education. On the one hand, if labour demand shifts towards higher-
skilled workers in the future, these young people may be ill-equipped to meet that 
challenge. On the other hand, entering the labour market may be a rational re-
sponse if the quality of the vocational training available is low. 
To what extent are these findings applicable to the remaining Eastern Partner-
ship countries? If migration patterns and cultural norms in Moldova are similar to 
the other Eastern Partnership countries, it is plausible to assume that most parents 
everywhere take the welfare of their children into account when they decide 
whether to migrate. It is therefore unlikely that the overall impact from migration 
and remittances on the wellbeing of children is negative on average. There is also 
evidence from other Eastern Partnership countries that many households spend 
extra income due to remittances on the education of their children (Coupé and 
Vakhitova (2013, Ukraine Country Study): p.58); Georgia: p.41; Moldova: p.43). 
At the same time, there is a real risk that easy access to low-skilled jobs abroad 
may discourage some adolescents from pursuing vocational training. 
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3.2.4. Impact on Elderly Left Behind 
 
Most Eastern Partnership countries are experiencing aging populations; this 
trend will continue during the coming decades. At the same, support systems and 
long-term care for infirm elderly individuals are not well developed; so far, most 
of the care burden falls on adult children (Bélorgey, 2012, p.114 5, summarizing 
evidence from several Eastern Partnership countries). Quite plausibly, migrants 
will be less able to support their elderly parents than those adult children who live 
in the country of origin or even in the same region as their elderly parent. At the 
same time, adult children who are migrants may be better off financially and may 
therefore be able to make higher transfers to their elderly parents. 
Little information is presently available on how migration affects the wellbeing 
of elderly individuals in the Eastern Partnership countries. Preliminary findings 
from Luecke and Stoehr (2012) for Moldova suggest that emotional well-being 
(measured by the frequency and intensity of depressed feelings) is best for elderly 
who live in the same household with an adult child. The farther away the adult 
child lives (same region within Moldova, elsewhere in Moldova, abroad), the low-
er the positive effect on wellbeing relative to elderly individuals without children. 
The likelihood that an infirm elderly person who requires support actually receives 
such support is also highest for those who live with an adult child. 
On the other hand, the life satisfaction of elderly individuals is strongly affect-
ed by how well their adult children are doing. Adult children abroad are apparently 
considered to be doing well in life as they increase the life satisfaction of their 
elderly parents.  
In sum, elderly individuals tend to be less depressed and have access to neces-
sary mobility support if they live with an adult child. Unfortunately, the survey in 
Moldova (Luecke, Stoehr, 2012) did not ask how the welfare of the adult children 
is affected by living with an elderly parent. In any case, aging societies that are 
undergoing rapid structural change cannot realistically expect that adult children 
are able and willing to live near their infirm elderly parents to provide mobility 
support and care as needed. 
 
3.2.5. Gender Issues 
 
The share of women in the migrant population ranges from 12 percent in Bela-
rus and 15 percent in Azerbaijan to 43 percent in Georgia (Table 1). Women mi-
grants are frequently employed by households in the EU for domestic work and to 
care for children and elderly (Coupé and Vakhitova (2013, Ukraine Country 
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Study): p.43); Labadze and Tukhashvili (2013, Georgia Country Study): p.28). 
Studies from outside the Eastern Partnership region have found that becoming a 
breadwinner for their families may empower women migrants and strengthen their 
position within the intra-family decision-making process. On the other hand, 
women may be disproportionately affected by the risks involved in the migration 
process, including the risk of being trafficked (Omelianuk, 2005).  
Women who remain at home while their husbands work abroad may also be 
empowered by running their households on their own. On the other hand, in the 
context of traditional gender relations, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the 
absence of their husbands, women in Azerbaijan are frequently placed under the 
supervision of a male relative of their husband. They may lose personal autonomy, 
including in financial decisions for their household, and may be prevented from 
working outside the home or continuing their education. There is also anecdotal 
evidence that girls with migrant parents may be “married off” at a young age (Al-
lahveranov and Huseynov (2013, Azerbaijan Country Report), p.44).  
Unfortunately, little comprehensive evidence exists on how the social status of 
women in the Eastern Partnership countries is affected by migration, either by 
family members or by themselves. The existing anecdotal evidence serves as a 
useful reminder of the opportunities as well as risks that may be involved. 
 
3.2.6. Change in Societal Values 
 
Evidence from other high-emigration countries demonstrates that as migrants 
are exposed to the culture of the host country for a long time, they may adopt some 
of the values related to that culture. Examples include households in Middle East-
ern countries with migrants in Western Europe whose fertility declined relative to 
households without migrants or with migrants in the Gulf countries (Fargues, 
2006).  
There is evidence from Moldova that individuals with migration experience in 
Western Europe as well as their families and friends are more likely to favour 
political parties that actively promote political integration with Western Europe 
(Omar Mahmoud et al., 2012). Statistical tests confirm that it is really the experi-
ence of living in Western Europe and sharing this experience with friends and 
relatives that accounts for the difference in voting behaviour, rather than pre-
existing political preferences that might have driven the decision to migrate to 
Western Europe rather than to Russia. 
Given the substantial number of migrants from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 
in the EU, it seems likely that the process of intensifying economic and political 
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integration with the EU will benefit from political support by individuals who 
have been exposed, directly through their own migration experience or indirectly 
through migrant relatives or friends, to the political culture of EU countries. This 
linkage adds a political dimension to increased mobility between the EU and the 
Eastern Partnership countries. 
 
 
3.3. Overall Assessment: A Migration Scorecard? 
 
The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that costs and benefits of migra-
tion cover a wide range of dimensions, ranging from the “economic” ones, some 
of which are at least potentially quantifiable, to the more nuanced and qualitative, 
involving concepts such as social capital and cohesion, which may escape easy 
measurement. It is thus very difficult to provide a single answer to the very valid 
question of whether the balance of costs and benefits for a migration-sending 
country is positive or negative at any point in time. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, in order to summarize the discussion in the 
past few sections, we propose in this section to develop a simple, qualitative and 
expert-opinion-based “Migration Scorecard”. 
 
Table 2. Migration Costs and Benefits Scorecard 
 
Benefits Costs 
Overall 
Benefits/ 
Costs 
Increa-
sed GDP 
Growth
Contri-
bution 
to 
Poverty 
Reduc-
tion 
Contri-
bution 
to Fi-
nancial 
Markets 
Develo-
pment 
Evi-
dence of 
Dutch 
Disease 
Social 
Costs at 
house-
hold 
level 
Brain 
Drain 
Armenia H H L H M M H/M 
Azerbaijan L L L L L L L/L 
Belarus L L L L M L L/L 
Georgia H H M H H M H/H 
Moldova H H H H M M H/M 
Ukraine L L L L M M L/M 
 
Table 2 describes the proposed approach, for six dimensions of the costs and 
benefits of migration: (i) the extent of the contribution to migration (chiefly 
through remittances) to GDP growth; (ii) the extent of the contribution of migra-
tion to poverty reduction; (iii) the extent of the contribution of migration to the 
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development of financial markets; (iv) the evidence of Dutch Disease; (v) the ex-
tent of social costs borne at the household level; (vi) the evidence of brain 
drain/brain waste as a result of migration. There are three possible marks, L, M, H, 
and the overall marks for benefits and costs reflect the individual components. 
Table 2 carries an interesting message. It is quite clear that the size of the bene-
fits and the costs is proportional to the importance of migration with respect to the 
size of the economy. Thus, for instance, in the case of Moldova it is quite apparent 
that there have been large benefits accruing to the macro-economy as well as to 
individual households. On the other hand, given the scale of the phenomenon, the 
costs (and associated risks) have also been large.  
At the opposite of the spectrum are instead countries such as Azerbaijan and 
Belarus, where the scale of migration and its economic effects are relatively mi-
nor, and hence the overall macroeconomic benefits are likely to be limited. Costs 
of migration are not necessarily equally low for the households experiencing 
them—if not well addressed through public policies, they might in fact tip the 
balance of benefits and costs in a negative way. 
The more general observation is that, from the discussion in this chapter, costs 
and benefits can be altered by the adoption of specific policies and the strengthen-
ing of institutions dealing with migration. We will examine in Chapter 5 how the 
Eastern Partnership countries fare in this respect, and what changes can be rec-
ommended to improve the balance. 
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4. Labour Migration and 
Demographic Trends in Eastern 
Partnership Countries 
A relevant question for both EaP and EU policymaker is the potential for con-
tinued (and perhaps increased) labour migration in the future. Fears of uncon-
trolled migration flows have often been a strong element in the debate on migra-
tion policies, even though experience in this respect has often been anti-climactic. 
In this chapter we attempt to provide an informed framework for assessing the 
potential for increased migration flows, were the EU policies to become more 
liberal towards the EaP countries. We thus discuss projections of possible future 
labour migration flows from Eastern Partnership countries to the European Union 
under different scenarios until the year 2050. The approach adopted for these sce-
narios is demographic (as explained later), coupled with assumptions on the pro-
pensity to migrate to the EU vs. the Russian Federation. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction: Forecasting Migration Flows 
 
Migration flows are difficult to forecast. As argued by Bijak and Wisniowski 
(2009), “Forecasting migration is a very difficult research task, for the reasons 
including, though not limited to the following: (1) inherent randomness of the pro-
cesses under study and their susceptibility to hardly predictable factors; (2) lack 
of coherent definitions of immigration across countries and time; (3) lack of com-
prehensive migration theories; and (4) lack of data or incomplete data, including 
short time series”.4 These problems are particularly severe for EaP countries, as 
was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In addition to the lack of reliable data, particu-
larly for the earlier years under study in this paper, we also argued that migration 
from EaP countries followed a three-stage pattern, with quite different underlying 
                                                 
4 Bijak, Jakub and Arkadiusz Wiśniowski (2009): Forecasting of immigration flows until 
2025 for selected European countries using expert information, IDEA Working Papers n. 
7, May. 
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motivation for migration. This makes the use of time series-based estimation vir-
tually useless and impossible. Other approaches have included the use of various 
opinion surveys, some of which have been reported in the Country Studies. Re-
sults obtained through these surveys tend to find large numbers of potential mi-
grants. However, these findings are highly questionable, as they are at best “un-
constrained desires”, and often affected by social and political considerations that 
may play fleeting roles in such responses. 
For these considerations, in this chapter we have followed a different approach, 
marked by two main assumptions. First, we posit, based on the evidence presented 
in the Country Studies, that EaP countries at present have reached a “steady state” 
as far as labour migration flows overall are concerned. The second assumption is 
that the propensity to migrate changes according to the age of the potential mi-
grant, and tends to be higher for younger migrants and to decline with age, as the 
opportunity cost of migration increases. 
Armed with these two assumptions, we are then able to utilize population pro-
jections by age cohort to calculate the amount of potential migrants over the years, 
taking into account the progressive aging of the population for (almost all) EaP 
countries. The numbers thus obtained can then be interpreted as the potential sup-
ply of labour migrants over time, other economic and non-economic factors being 
constant. 
We also provide simulations revolving around a very important parameter, 
namely the propensity to migrate towards the Russian Federation or towards the 
EU. We have argued in previous chapters that the visa-free policy of the Russian 
Federation has created a virtually unconstrained situation for potential migrants, 
and hence can be considered a relatively stable equilibrium. Changes to the “pro-
pensity parameter” can then importantly affect the total amount of potential mi-
grants going towards either of the two main destinations. 
 
 
4.2. Basic Scenario 1 
 
The basic scenario for migration projection takes into account forecasted 
changes in EaP country population numbers according to the 2010 UN population 
forecast.5 It is assumed that all other factors affecting migration remain constant.6 
Details on the formulas used for the calculations are provided in the Appendix 2. 
                                                 
5 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. 
We are using medium-fertility, normal mortality, zero-migration variant. "Zero-migration" 
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4.2.1. Data and sources 
 
UN 2010 population forecast. We use a basic forecast for medium-fertility, nor-
mal mortality, zero-migration variant.7 The forecast provides population figures for 
each sex and 5-year age cohorts until 2050. Overall, the population of EaP countries 
is forecasted to decline by about 11 million or 14%. An even larger decline of 14 
million is expected to occur in the EaP working-age population (Figure 13 below). 
Ukraine makes up the largest share of this decline (about 10 mln persons). Azerbai-
jan stands out as the only country in which the population is expected to increase. 
Detailed UN population projections are shown in Appendix table 7. 
 
Figure 13. UN projection for 15-64 population 2010-2050, EaP total and by country 
 
Source: UN, Population Division. 
 
The age and sex structure of the population is also expected to change along 
with the total population. In addition to the UN population forecast, we have used 
                                                                                                                           
variant estimates population numbers assuming no permanent migration. However, UN 
estimates of permanent migration rates for the EaP countries are so low that results remain 
practically the same when "normal" migration variant is used.  
6 In particular, we assume that the distributions of all other variables that determine indi-
vidual migration decision conditional on individual age and sex remain constant. 
7 "Zero-migration" variant estimates population numbers assuming that there are no per-
manent migration. However, results are UN estimates of permanent migration rates for the 
EaP countries are so low that results remain practically the same when "normal" migration 
variant is used. 
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a combination of household surveys in each country and, in case of Belarus, a 
micro-census.8  
From each of these surveys we obtained  
1. estimates for probability of a household member to reside abroad, depending 
on age and sex of a household member. In other words, these estimates refer to 
migrants, whose household remained in the country of origin i.e. temporary 
migrants. Whenever possible, we used estimates for labour migrants, but in 
some cases, students were also counted in.  
Table 7 and Figure 15 in the appendix show estimated migration probabilities 
for each age group and sex in the EaP countries. 
2. estimates of shares of migrants that choose to go to EU, Russia or other coun-
try. These shares are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Destination of EaP Migrants, latest data 
Country of origin % to the EU % to Russia % to other 
Armenia 4 74 22 
Azerbaijan 1 77 22 
Belarus 4 90 6 
Georgia 35 40 25 
Moldova 21 64 14 
Ukraine 44 47 8 
Total EaP 29 56 14 
 
 
4.2.2. Results for Scenario 1 
By applying projected population numbers for each age and sex cohort, con-
stant estimated age and sex migration propensities, and constant shares for mi-
grants destinations (assumed equal across all ages and sex groups) we obtain a 
forecast for total number of migrants to the EU. The results are shown in Figure 14 
and table 4. 
In the year 2010, the total number of labour migrants from the EaPcountries 
that were residing in the EU is estimated to be at 817 thousands. Based on the 
simulations in this Scenario, by 2020we expect this number to drop by 60 thou-
sands and by 2030 by a further 80 thousands. The overall decline in number of 
                                                 
8 Armenia: ADB Household Survey On Remittances And Poverty 2007; Azerbaijan: Adb 
Household Survey On Remittances And Poverty 2007.; Belarus: Census 2009 micro-
sample; Moldova: LFS 2010;  Georgia: Geostat 2008 and Georgia on the Move 2008 sur-
vey; Ukraine: SSS-2008 survey. 
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migrants by 2050 is estimated to be about 300 thousands or a drop of 40%. The 
largest contribution to this decline comes from Ukraine, which would send almost 
200 thousands less migrants to the EU. Number of migrants from Georgia would 
decline by 50 thousands and from Moldova by 30 thousands. To repeat, all these 
projections are based on demographic changes alone.  
 
Figure 14.  Results for Scenario 1. Number of Migrants to EU, thsd. 
 
 
Table 4. Results for scenario 1 
 year Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine Total 
Actual 2010 8 3 8 149 68 581 817 
Projected 2015 9 3 8 145 66 559 789 
Projected 2020 8 3 8 138 62 534 753 
Projected 2025 8 3 7 128 59 506 710 
Projected 2030 8 3 7 119 55 477 670 
Projected 2035 8 4 6 113 52 446 629 
Projected 2040 8 4 6 105 49 415 587 
Projected 2045 8 4 6 99 44 390 550 
Projected 2050 7 4 5 94 40 374 524 
 
The share of migrants in the labour force of each EaP country changes only 
slightly between 2010 and 2050: from 1.8% to 1.7% in Ukraine, from 2.6% to 
2.4% in Moldova and less in other EaP countries. (We assume constant age and 
sex propensities for migration, therefore the only changes in the share of labour 
force would be due to relative changes in the population pyramid and those are too 
small to make a large difference). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Moldova
Belarus
Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Ukraine
(right axis)
LABOUR MIGRATION FROM THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 113 55 
Despite the absolute drop in the number of EaP migrants, their share in the EU 
population might increase if the EU population were to decline at a higher rate. 
However, as shown in Table 4.3, EU population is actually projected to increase by 
11 million and so the share of EaP migrants in the total EU population would drop 
from 0.16% to 0.1%. Unlike the total EU population, the EU working-age popula-
tion is projected to decline from 330 to 287 mln. Nevertheless, share of EU migrants 
in working-age population is still projected to decline from 0.25% to 0.18%. 
 
Table 5. Numbers of EaP migrants and share in the EU population 
Year EAP mig-rants, ths 
EU popula-
tion, ths 
% EaP mig-
rants in total 
pop. 
EU pop 15-
64, ths 
% EaP mig-
rants 
2010 817 500,441 0.16 330,291 0.25 
2015 789 506,315 0.16 332,245 0.24 
2020 753 510,950 0.15 327,440 0.23 
2025 710 514,150 0.14 322,055 0.22 
2030 670 515,849 0.13 315,093 0.21 
2035 629 516,099 0.12 307,005 0.20 
2040 587 515,376 0.11 300,131 0.20 
2045 550 513,898 0.11 293,321 0.19 
2050 524 511,661 0.10 287,613 0.18 
 
 
4.3. Scenario 2: A More “Attractive” EU for EaP Migrants 
 
One of the factors, assumed to remain constant in the above calculations, is the 
share of migrants from an EaP country that choose EU countries as their destina-
tion ("EU-migration propensity factor"). The actual 2010 shares for different EaP 
countries are shown in Table 4 above. 
As of 2010, Russia remains as one of the most important destinations for the 
EaP migrants, attracting more than a half of all the migrants, while EU attracted 
less than one third. However, changes in economic and political conditions in EU 
and Russia, changes in visa regulations and cost of travel may result in different 
allocation of migrants. For example, after the reintroduction of visa regime be-
tween Georgia and Russia and the closure of direct air travel between the two 
countries, share of Georgian migrants going to Russia dropped from 64% to 40%, 
and share going to EU increased from 23 to 35%.  
Given the indications provided by the first scenario discussed in the previous sec-
tion, we now ask a different question, namely by how much should "EU-migration 
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propensity" increase to compensate for the demographic decline and keep the overall 
number of EaP migrants to the EU constant (817 thousands at the level of 2010). 
While there are many possible combinations of migrants from each of the six EaP 
countries that could result in an overall unchanged number of labour migrants, we 
have simulated a scenario in which all countries maintain the initial level of migra-
tion to the EU. The results are displayed in Table 6 and Figure 15 below. 
 
Table 6. Necessary "EU propensity" to keep constant 2010 levels 
 Year Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Actual 2010 4 1 4 35 21 44 
Estimated 2015 4 1 4 36 22 46 
Estimated 2020 4 1 4 38 23 48 
Estimated 2025 4 1 5 41 25 51 
Estimated 2030 4 1 5 44 26 54 
Estimated 2035 4 1 5 46 28 58 
Estimated 2040 4 1 5 49 30 62 
Estimated 2045 4 1 6 53 33 66 
Estimated 2050 5 1 6 56 36 69 
 
Figure 15. Necessary "EU propensity" to keep constant 2010 levels, share of EaP mi-
grants going to EU 
 
 
These calculations are revealing. In order to maintain a constant flow of mi-
grants from each EaP as of 2010, major changes in the propensity to migrate to the 
Russian Federation would be required. In particular, through the period 2010-
2050, the share of migrants going to EU would have to increase from 44% to al-
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most 70% in Ukraine, from 35% to 65% in Georgia and from 21% to 36% in Mol-
dova. Changes for the remaining three countries are more trivial. 
What conclusions can we draw from the results of this simple simulation? In 
our opinion, they show that the possibility of a major flood of migrants from EaP 
countries following the adoption of more liberal policies by the EU is rather re-
mote. Just to maintain the current numbers unchanged would require substantial 
behavioural changes on the part of migrants from the largest migration-sending 
countries. While this is not altogether impossible, one should also keep in mind 
that the Russian Federation is likely to continue to increase its own demand for 
migrants, and has good chances to become an even more attractive destination on 
its own. Thus, the ability by the EU to shift migrants’ preferences in large propor-
tions cannot be taken for granted; by the same token, the likelihood of large migra-
tory flows towards the EU from the EaP countries can be discounted as highly 
unlikely (barring of course the occurrence of severely negative socio-economic 
developments in the EaP countries). 
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Appendix 1: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 7. UN population projection. 
Year Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine Total 
2010 3,092 9,187 9,596 4,352 3,571 45,447 75,245 
2015 3,128 9,753 9,445 4,223 3,451 44,218 74,218 
2020 3,149 10,230 9,281 4,079 3,360 43,049 73,148 
2025 3,132 10,562 9,095 3,921 3,262 41,822 71,794 
2030 3,104 10,805 8,883 3,759 3,144 40,516 70,211 
2035 3,073 11,041 8,656 3,603 3,022 39,244 68,639 
2040 3,036 11,272 8,438 3,458 2,905 38,103 67,212 
2045 2,990 11,464 8,223 3,316 2,785 37,065 65,843 
2050 2,929 11,579 8,002 3,186 2,660 36,075 64,431 
 
% change -5% +26% -17% -27% -26% -21% -14% 
Source: UN population forecast. 
 
Table 8. Propensity to migrate by age and sex 
 
Moldova Ukraine Belarus Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan 
Male Fe-male Male
Fe-
male Male
Fe-
male Male
Fe-
male Male
Fe-
male Male 
Fe-
male 
15-19 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 
20-24 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.01 
25-29 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.02 
30-34 0.26 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.02 
35-39 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.22 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.02 
40-44 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.22 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.02 
45-49 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.10 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.01 
50-54 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.09 0.01 
55-59 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.01 
60-64 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
65-69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
70+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.01 0.00 
Sources: see text. 
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Figure 16. Age and Sex Specific Propensities to Migrate 
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Appendix 2. Methods and formulas. 
 
 
1. The projected number of future migrants originating from each country is cal-
culated as a summation:  
NT = ASNASTpAS 
where,  
 T - year, T = 2015, 2020,... 2050 
 A - 5-year age group, 0-4, 5-9, etc. 
 S - sex group, male or female. 
 NAST- UN projection for the country's population of the demographic group 
A and S. 
 pAS- Average propensity to migrate in the given age and sex demographic 
group. pAS were estimated from the household surveys conducted in each country 
in the period of 2007 to 2010. We assume that pAS remain constant for all the fu-
ture time periods T. Thus, our forecast for the total number of migrants does not 
take into account potential economic, cultural, political or other changes that may 
alter estimated migration propensities in the demographic group, that were ob-
served in 2007-2010. 
2. The projected number of migrants from a country that will choose EU as their 
destination is calculated as:  
NTEU=STEU*NT- where STEU - is a share of the total number of migrants from the 
country that choose EU as their destination. In the scenario 1 we assume that 
STEUremains constant for all the future years 2015...2050. In the scenario 2 we 
estimate STEU, that results in the constant number of migrants to the EU from the 
country.  
STEU is such that: NTEU = N2010EU , for T = 2015...2050.  
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5. Policies Affecting Labour 
Migration in EaP Countries 
The labour migration flows discussed in the earlier sections have taken place in 
an evolving institutional and legislative environment, both on the sending and the 
receiving country side. Policies and institutions have a potentially important role 
in determining the developmental outcomes of migration, or in affecting the bal-
ance of costs and benefits. The country studies for the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries demonstrate conclusively that some of the relevant policies are not migration-
specific: overall economic stability and growth, financial sector development, 
education, social protection all affect the decisions of people to migrate and the 
way in which their efforts are translated into economic success. Migration-specific 
policies and institutions, on the other hand, may have a powerful effect on incen-
tives for forms of migration that are in the best interest of migrants, sending na-
tions and receiving ones. A subset of these policies involves relations with diaspo-
ras, and their contribution to the societies of origin. 
In this section we will briefly review some of the salient aspects of non-
migration policies that have affected labour migration flows, with particular atten-
tion to overall macroeconomic policies, financial sector policies, business envi-
ronment, education policies and policies with regards to old-age protection. We 
then follow with a review of policies and institutions explicitly directed towards 
the management of migratory flows, first examining the current situation with 
regard to EaP countries themselves, and then discussing the approaches taken by 
the European Union and its member states. A brief review of the current policies 
of the Russian Federation is also offered, given the importance of that destination 
for migrants from EaP countries. 
The policy framework is illustrated in schematic form in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Policy Channels for Migration and Socio-Economic Outcomes 
Policy 
Area Issues Agenda Economic Rationales 
Non-Migration-Specific 
Macro-
eco-
nomic 
Economic 
Stability + 
growth 
Policies that favour creation of 
jobs in sending countries 
Job Growth – Per-capita income 
growth - Incentives to Migrate 
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Policy 
Area Issues Agenda Economic Rationales 
Mana-
gement 
Manage-
ment of 
Remittanc-
es Inflows 
Policies to prevent Dutch Dis-
ease effects on sending countries 
from large inflows of remittanc-
es. 
Avoidance of Dutch disease, with 
possibility of vicious circle of 
dependence on remittances. 
Sectoral 
Business 
Environ-
ment 
Improve the business environ-
ment to favour growth of em-
ployment opportunities and 
encourage migrants to increase 
their use of remittances toward 
investment. 
Reform of business environment is 
good for the economy at large, and 
especially good for migrants’ deci-
sions. 
Financial 
Sector 
Reforms 
Growth and stabilization of 
financial institutions; 
Reduction of costs of remittanc-
es; 
Financial deepening through use 
of remittances. 
Possibility to support financial 
market deepening, greater availa-
bility of resources or investment 
and growth; 
Greater impact on poverty reduc-
tion through reduced intermedia-
tion costs for remittances 
Education 
Reforms 
Reform of vocational education 
to match skills to market de-
mands, and reduce incentives to 
migrate; 
Reform of higher-education 
(including certification of de-
grees). 
Disconnect between education and 
local labour market needs may 
increase incentives to migration; 
Demand for certain types of skills 
may increase as a result of migra-
tion opportunities; 
Availability of remittances may 
increase demand for education by 
poorest families. 
Social 
Protection 
Better targeting of social protec-
tion tools to needs of migrants 
left behind. 
Mitigation of negative conse-
quences on families and more 
generally on social capital in send-
ing communities. 
Migration-Specific 
Migra-
tion 
Strate-
gy 
Strategic 
and legisla-
tive 
framework 
A clear understanding of the 
multi-dimensional challenges of 
migration, and the supportive 
role of government. 
General-equilibrium nature of 
migration outcomes. 
Govern-
ment coor-
dination 
Assignment of coordinating 
function and sufficient authority 
to government body. 
Economies of scope in government 
policy-making. 
Interna-
tional 
Coop-
eration 
Agreements 
on key 
aspects of 
migration 
framework 
with receiv-
ing coun-
tries 
Frameworks for workers’ rights, 
protection and obligations; 
Addressing portability of Social 
Security Benefits; 
Addressing issues of health 
insurance. 
Overcome negative incentives to 
bi-directional flows of labour mi-
grants. 
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Policy 
Area Issues Agenda Economic Rationales 
Diaspo-
ra 
Strate-
gy 
Inst. 
framework 
for diaspo-
ra activities
Provision of “open arms” policy, 
without excessive government 
interference 
Exploitation of informational 
asymmetries; wedge between risk 
premium for insiders/connected 
and outsiders. 
 
 
 
5.1. Policies Affecting Labour Migration Outcomes – Non-Migration-
Specific 
 
5.1.1. Macroeconomic Management 
 
The six country studies portray a complex picture of the effects of economic 
and sectoral policies on migration in the EaP countries in the period following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. The deep recession of the early nineties and the 
emergence of new countries with national agendas, and in some case conflicts, 
were a major motor for the “phase one” migration flows up until the mid-1990s or 
so. There are a few lessons that can be usefully gleaned from this early period and 
that could be applicable to future relations, keeping in mind the extraordinary na-
ture of the events that occurred then. Perhaps the most pertinent (and less contro-
versial) is that within a context of overall declining economic conditions, and in 
most cases collapsing public sector revenues, the absence of safeguards for the 
safety nets may exacerbate the social costs and push large section of society to 
seek alternatives, among which migration may be one option. This lesson was 
partly heeded during the 2008-2009 crisis, which hit Armenia, Ukraine and Mol-
dova particularly hard, but during which greater attention was paid to protection of 
social spending in a generally recessionary environment.  
Whereas growth was restored, to a certain extent, to EaP countries in the late 
1990s and during the first part of the 2000s, macroeconomic management has 
progressively become more complicated even as the fruits of migration were in-
creasing in the form of sharply growing remittances. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
particularly for countries such as Armenia and Moldova, with their very high pro-
portion of remittances in national income, there is a marked risk of “Dutch dis-
ease”, namely an increase in relative prices of non-tradables due to the inflow of 
foreign exchange, which in turn results in lower employment opportunities, thus 
fuelling the incentives for migration by domestic residents. Counteracting this 
possibility is particularly difficult, as on the one hand the ability of the Central 
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Bank to sterilize the foreign exchange inflows is very limited in those countries 
due to the shallow nature of financial markets and the sheer size of remittances, 
and on the other hand the scope for fiscal policies aiming at a surplus to help ab-
sorb resources is quite limited. 
As noted before, for countries where remittances, though important, may not be 
of a magnitude comparable to that of Moldova or Armenia, management of their 
effects is naturally one component of overall management of external inflows. 
This was explicitly noted in the case of Azerbaijan, for instance, where the re-
sources from the oil and gas boom vastly overshadow the (not insignificant) remit-
tances. Also in the case of Ukraine, the Country Study notes that remittances do 
not appear to have caused any serious macro-management problem per se, while 
the Belarus study, which raises questions about the actual magnitude of remittanc-
es, cannot exclude the possibility that remittances might complicate the life of 
policymakers, also in view of the attempts at control over the nominal exchange 
rate often practiced there. 
 
5.1.2. Financial Sector Policies 
 
Financial sector policies—meant both as policies to ensure stability of financial 
institutions, as well as to encourage them to take advantage of and promote inno-
vations specifically in the areas of remittances management—have exercised a 
deep impact on the effects of migration on economic development, in EaP coun-
tries as elsewhere in the world. It has been noted in the literature that remittances 
indeed contribute to financial sector deepening and development particularly when 
accompanied by policies that encourage stability and do not inhibit innovation by 
banking and non-banking institutions.9 
The case study of Moldova, for instance, argues that the banking system sub-
stantially benefitted from the increasing inflow of remittances. While initially the 
share of funds transferred through banks was quite small, the insecurity of the 
informal channels and the liberalization of the rapid money transfer market orient-
ed the transfer practice towards the banking system. Currently, in Moldova there 
are over 20 rapid money transfer systems in operation, and the cost of remitting 
has been substantially lowered. The impact of remittances on the banking system 
is not restricted only to monetary transfers. The increase in the financial capacity 
                                                 
9 See Reena Aggarwal, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Maria Soledad Martínez Pería (2011) Do 
Remittances Promote Financial Development? Journal of Development Economics, vol. 
96, Issue 2, November; also Paola Giuliano and Marta Ruiz-Arranz (2005), Remittances, 
Financial Development and Growth, IMF Working Paper WP/05/234 
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of households is also reflected in other aspects. In 2004, the share of households 
with savings was relatively small (those with savings “at home” were 8.5% and in 
a bank account they were 1.6%). However, in 2008, it was estimated that the num-
ber of households with savings of more than USD 500 was four times higher 
among families receiving remittances than households without migrants (29% vs. 
8%). It was noted that the volume of remittances directly correlates with net de-
posits of physical persons, which grew by 5.5 times in 2010 compared to 2003, as 
well as with the number of net credits in the economy, which in the same period 
increased 4.4 times and follow the trends of remittances. In sum, the banking sys-
tem deepened and became more efficient, as a result of the increased availability 
of resources, and the prudent policies of the National Bank of Moldova. 
On the other hand, in the case of Armenia, the country study notes that “finan-
cial markets in Armenia do not seem to have capitalized on the opportunities pro-
vided by large remittance flows. While a large portion of remittances is chan-
nelled through formal financial intermediaries, the lack of financial products tar-
geted on migrants has resulted in reluctance by the population to use Armenian 
banks. In this sense, opportunities are lost for channelling resources to invest-
ments through intermediation.” While it is not entirely clear why Armenia appears 
not to have benefitted from remittances-induced financial deepening, this is an 
area that should be of concern of policymakers, as it may signal lack of confidence 
of the population in the institutions that oversee financial sector stability and safety. 
Within the realm of financial sector policies lies also the issue of costs of remit-
tances. This has been on the policy agenda on both sending and receiving coun-
tries for quite some time, but nevertheless remains a key issue in the transmission 
chain between migrant activity and economic benefits in sending countries. Re-
ducing the costs of remittances requires coordination between sending and receiv-
ing countries, in competition and prudential standards, and is of primary im-
portance for the EU-EaP policy agenda. 
 
5.1.3. The Business Environment 
 
For all six EaP Countries the quality of the business environment is an im-
portant determinant of the outcomes of the migration process. A poor business 
environment is conducive to poor growth of economic opportunities, and hence to 
increased incentives for labour migration. The ease of doing business, in addition, 
will affect the disposition of migrants and their families to use remittances for 
investment rather than consumption purposes. From this point of view, EaP coun-
tries have tackled the Business Environment agenda in very different ways, with 
markedly different outcomes with respect to migration. The studies for Armenia 
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and Georgia, for instance, note that a substantial drive to decrease the regulatory 
and discretionary burden on businesses small and large has led to noticeable in-
creases in return of entrepreneurial migrants, as well as increased investments by 
the diaspora (a point discussed later in this chapter). At the other hand of the spec-
trum, Belarus has continued to maintain burdensome controls on the entrepreneur-
ial and private sector activities in general, and has such has seen very low levels of 
small and medium business formation, including from migrants. 
 
5.1.4. Education Policies 
 
A stylized fact of labour migration flows in EaP countries is that migrants tend 
to be more educated than the general population – but often are placed in jobs that 
do not fully exploit their qualifications. Hence, all six country studies stress the 
importance of reform in the education sector to provide the right skills and incen-
tives for young generations in their choice between staying and migrating.  
There are two main issues that are highlighted by the Country Studies. First, 
the quality of vocational education is thought to be wanting (“teaching jobs that no 
longer exist”) in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine. This results in large 
numbers of entrants into the labour force that are faced with a high probability of 
unemployment at home and for whom the alternative of temporary or permanent 
migration is rather appealing.  
Secondly, at the other hand of the spectrum, college graduates also appear to 
face difficulties in the domestic labour market in finding suitable job opportuni-
ties. The country papers provide a striking illustration of the challenges in this 
area: 
The Armenia report states that “Many young people see labour migration as an 
alternative to unemployment in their home country, and the lack of oppor-
tunities for the skills they have developed. In this respect, the Armenian 
educational system still has to adjust to the challenges of the evolving 
economic structure – too many young Armenians acquire skills that can-
not be properly used at home or abroad”. 
The Ukraine report notes that “many new university graduates and older workers 
with higher education migrate in order to find jobs corresponding if not to 
their professional ambitions then at least to their salary expectations”. 
The Georgia report summarizes the twin challenges of inadequate tertiary and 
vocational education as follows: “The high unemployment figures are the 
result of a considerable skills mismatch: the country produces far too 
many university graduates and too few technically skilled workers. Thus, 
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to remedy this situation, the country needs to invest considerably in high-
quality vocational training while at the same time upgrading its techno-
logical base (leading to the creation of more high-skilled jobs). Until this 
happens, the labour market will continue to push young Georgians into 
migration”. 
Education reform has been on the agenda in all EaP countries over the past two 
decades; the lesson we can draw from the Country Studies is that there is consid-
erable scope for improvement left. 
Another, related, aspect highlighted in the Country Studies, which may become 
even more important as initiatives such as the “Blue Card” take hold, is that of 
recognition of standards in higher education. The underemployment of skills of 
migrants in EU countries that was discussed in Chapter 3 is often attributed (fairly 
or unfairly) to the less-than-marketable quality of the higher education skills ac-
quired in sending countries. The lack of a generally-accepted system of evaluation 
and certification (even within the EU) is certainly a major barrier that should be on 
the forefront of the policy agenda for better migration outcomes. 
 
5.1.5. Social Protection Policies 
 
Chapter 3 noted that migration can affect important aspects of a country’s so-
cial capital, often (but not always) in negative ways, and that the most vulnerable 
groups include the families left behind, particularly children and the old-aged. 
Social protection policies, ranging from old-age and disability schemes to targeted 
(and often non-targeted) social assistance programs bear a crucial importance in 
migration outcomes on two important fronts. First, social policies, if well targeted 
and provided with sufficient means, can help mitigate the most negative effects on 
those left behind. Secondly, when formal old-age schemes are present and workers 
build a stake in them, the need for coordination with receiving countries on how 
benefits are to be accrued becomes important. This latter point is discussed in sec-
tion C, where we review bilateral agreements in place in these areas. 
The evidence presented in the Country Studies shows that formal social protec-
tion policies are seldom targeted to the needs of the “families left behind”, alt-
hough the awareness of the need for targeted interventions might be increasing. 
Cantarji, Vasile and Georgeta Mincu (2013, Moldova Country Study), for in-
stance, note that the Ministry of Social Protection and Family recently conducted a 
census of children with parent(s) working abroad, with an aim to establish child 
protection policies in these areas. 
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More often than not, protection to families is left to informal family networks, 
and also to the activities of several NGOs, which are present in all EaP countries. 
Chubrik, Alexander and Aliaksei Kazlou (2013, Belarus Country study) note the 
presence of international NGOs whose mission is specifically to help families 
remain connected to relatives abroad, in the absence of official programs to that 
effect. 
It should be noted, however, that families of migrants do constitute a subset of 
vulnerable groups that might require the use of public resources to alleviate ex-
treme forms of distress. Deciding on rational allocation of resources among differ-
ent groups is a matter of national consensus, but in those countries where migra-
tion is of high importance, those specific need should adequately represented. 
 
 
5.2. EaP Approaches to Migration Management 
 
5.2.1. Institutional and Strategic Arrangements 
 
While the importance of migration for economic and social development is in-
creasingly recognized both in official circles and within civil society at large, it 
would be difficult to argue that EaP countries share a commonality of approach to 
migration management, both on the legal and the institutional sides. This is due to 
a variety of factors, including differences in institutional development, differences 
in perception of the importance of the phenomenon, and objective differences in 
paths of economic development over the past twenty years or so. 
Table 10 displays in synthetic form the current institutional arrangements in the 
EaP region. All EaP countries have adopted laws covering various aspects of mi-
gration, although implementation may be uneven. Not all countries, in addition, 
appear to have fully internalized the need for an integrated approach to labour 
migration. As was discussed earlier, for instance, in some countries the attention 
of policymakers to migration has concerned in particular immigration and refugees 
(Ukraine, Azerbaijan). Of the six EaP countries only Moldova and Armenia (with 
varying degrees of institutional strength and country-related stresses) have had the 
best success in adopting a holistic approach to labour emigration management 
aimed at maximizing the benefits for the migrants and for the country at large.  
In Moldova, while ten Ministries or Departments deal with different aspects of 
migration issues, a policy-oriented consultative committee that is closely tied to 
the Prime Minister of Moldova, the National Commission for Population and De-
LABOUR MIGRATION FROM THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 113 69 
velopment (NCPD), provides policy coordination and has a mandate which in-
cludes identifying mechanisms of collection and exchange of disaggregated data 
on the main demographic indicators, including migration. The basic NCPD tasks 
are to coordinate the process of elaborating population policies including the ones 
having direct relations with international migration. The Action Plan (2011-2015) 
for the Implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-
2020) provides the legal and operational framework for the NCPD. 
Armenia (which, as noted in earlier sections, has the highest percentage of la-
bour migrants to the Russian Federation) stands out for its attempts to facilitate the 
use of the Diaspora as a powerful tool for development (see Box 1). It has had a 
Ministry for Diaspora Affairs since 2008, and several other public and private 
organizations have been active in the area of Diaspora development. However, the 
Country Study notes that in other areas of migration management and strategy, 
Armenia has yet to develop a clear institutional framework with assignment of 
responsibilities for the many issues concerned. This is in effect the reflection of 
the continuing lack of an overall Migration Strategy as a national priority docu-
ment with capacity to affect decisions in all important areas. 
Ukraine contributes the largest amount of labour migrants for the EaP coun-
tries, given its sheer size. However, the Country Paper notes that “The Concept of 
State Migration Policy was adopted only in the middle of 2011, after over fifteen 
years of discussion in parliament and other state bodies. Hence, Ukraine never 
really considered migration policy to be a priority. Instead, it tried to control im-
migration while doing little for Ukrainians working abroad. For example, the 
State Migration Service has a “Plan of Integration of [Im]migrants into Ukrainian 
Society for 2011-2015” but nothing for emigrants”. 
 
Table 10. Legal and institutional Arrangements for Migration in EaP Countries 
Country Official Strategy for Labour Migration 
Intra-Government Co-
ordinating Mechanism
Diaspora Policies and 
Institutions 
Armenia 
Law on the Organiza-
tion of Overseas Em-
ployment  (2010); 
"2012-2016 Action Plan 
for Implementation of 
the State Policy on 
Migration Regulation in 
the RA" (2011) 
No Policy body in place; 
State Migration Agency 
(a department of the Min-
istry of Territorial Ad-
ministration) is tasked 
with implementation of 
migration-related pro-
jects. 
Ministry for Diaspora 
Affairs 
Azerbaijan State Migration Pro-gramme (expired 2008) 
State Migration Service 
within the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (not a 
policy-making or coordi-
nating agency) 
State Committee on 
Work with the Diaspo-
ra 
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Country Official Strategy for Labour Migration 
Intra-Government Co-
ordinating Mechanism
Diaspora Policies and 
Institutions 
Belarus 
Strategy mostly con-
cerned with internal 
migration and immigra-
tion. National Migration 
Programme expired in 
2010 and not renewed 
No single body embraces 
all the activities and is-
sues associated with 
migration within a uni-
fied conceptual frame-
work 
Diaspora organisation 
of Belarusians of the 
world "Batskaush-
chyna" (NGO) 
Georgia 
Migration Strategy 
being drafted under the 
leadership of the State 
Commission on Migra-
tion 
State Commission on 
Migration Issues set up in 
2011.  Main goal:  
strengthen the coordina-
tion among agencies 
working on migration 
issues. 
State Ministry on Di-
aspora Issues (est. 
2008) 
Moldova 
National Strategy on 
Migration and Asylum 
(2011-2020) 
National Commission for 
Population and Develop-
ment 
No dedicated govern-
ment institution 
Ukraine Concept of State Migra-tion Policy (2011) 
State Migration Service 
(created Dec. 2010) 
Very active Diasporas, 
no dedicated govern-
ment institution 
Source: Country Studies. 
 
To date, the only Ukrainian state body actively dealing with potential and re-
turn labour migrants in Ukraine is the State Employment Service of the MLSP, 
which provides some training courses for the unemployed including return mi-
grants. The MLSP position has always been the same: focus on the situation in the 
country to reduce migration flows and stimulate current migrants to return and 
help return migrants to reintegrate into society.” 
In the case of Belarus, the country study notes that “No single body embraces 
all the activities and issues associated with migration within a unified conceptual 
framework. There is also a lack of migration methodology, relevant data collec-
tion and monitoring of migratory movements”. In fact, as is the case for Ukraine, 
existing legislation and mandates appear to be concerned chiefly with regulation of 
immigration, rather than facilitation of emigration. 
In Georgia, immigration policies have been rather liberal. However, with re-
gard to emigration policies, priorities and objectives, progress is only relatively 
recent. The Country Study notes that until 2011, the coordination mechanism 
among government entities and ministries with regard to migration issues was 
very weak, or even non-existent. In 2011, a State Commission on Migration Issues 
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was set up, with the main goal to strengthen coordination among agencies working 
on migration issues.10 
The Commission is working on a migration strategy, and an action plan should 
be ready by end 2012. The Commission also intends to improve the legal frame-
work for migration issues. The main points discussed in the draft migration strate-
gy document are the promotion of legal emigration, the fight against and preven-
tion of illegal migration, asylum system development and the promotion of digni-
fied return and reintegration. The draft migration strategy document also defines 
the responsibilities of the different entities involved. 
Finally, in the case of Azerbaijan, as noted above, institutional and legal ar-
rangements increasingly reflect the status of the country as a net importer of labour, 
and the growing preoccupation to regulate inflows of foreign workers. A State Mi-
gration Service within the Ministry of Internal Affairs was set up in March 2007 to 
implement the state migration policy, develop a migration management system and 
co-ordinate the activities of the relevant governmental bodies in the migration field. 
Allahveranov and Huseynov (2013, Azerbaijan Country Study) note that the Repub-
lic of Azerbaijan is a participant of the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, and has joined 
the Palermo Protocols related to the trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Azerbai-
jan has also signed bilateral agreements on the social security of migrants with Kyr-
gyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Ukraine, Italy, Russia, Moldova and Belarus, cover-
ing social protection of circular migration between countries, and a number of bilat-
eral agreements on cooperation in migration issues with the Russian Federation and 
Moldova. However “there is no established state policy targeted at promoting cir-
cular migration, including the mobility of skilled workers. State policies are mainly 
directed at regulating immigration and combating illegal migration”. 
 
Box 1. The Armenian Diaspora 
The Armenian Diaspora is often looked at as one of the most active and effective 
among migrant-sending countries. Indeed, the Diaspora strongly influences economic and 
human development in the Republic of Armenia. Numerous Diaspora Armenians take an 
                                                 
10 A number of ministries and other government entities are represented in the Migration 
Commission: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons 
from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Civil Registry and Migration Department  under the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Education and Science (it is actively involved,  takes care of returning mi-
grants' professional development and facilitates their integration), the Ministry of Econo-
my and Sustainable Development, the National Statistics Office of Georgia, the Georgian 
Parliament, the European Integration  Ministry  and  the Ministry of  Diaspora (all actively 
involved as well). Meetings are held at least once a month. 
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active part in the economic, political and social life of Armenia. Diaspora is one of the 
main generators of foreign investment: according to some estimates, fourteen major organ-
izations provided some US$630 million in assistance to Armenia in the decade following 
the disastrous earthquake of 1988 and Armenia’s independence in 1991.  
Diaspora activities encompass a broad range of initiatives of targeted economic and 
emergency assistance, building of education, health, and large communication infrastruc-
ture, capacity-building and cultural development projects, establishing joint ventures and 
restarting industrial enterprises. They facilitated the arrival of many international brands 
(Marriott, HSBC, KPMG, Coca-Cola, Synopsis) to Armenia and created branches of mul-
tinational corporations in the country. The Diaspora also works with the public sector and 
civil society, contributing to their capacity building.  
As Armenian migrants have accumulated rather significant savings abroad and have 
great potential in terms of knowledge and contacts, there is a rather high propensity to 
invest in non-productive assets such as real estate and efforts should be made to channel 
their resources as efficiently as possible to support Armenia’s development.  
The motivation and efforts of the Diaspora itself, coupled with the general public per-
ceptions in Armenia of the Diaspora as the primary push factor for country’s development, 
as well Armenia’s diaspora policy, delegated to a recently-established Ministry for Diaspo-
ra Affairs, whose mission is to better coordinate and mobilise Diaspora potential and activ-
ities. 
Source: Galstyan and Makaryan (2013, Armenia Country Study) 
 
5.2.2. The Role of Diasporas  
 
The role of diasporas in favouring better developmental outcomes of migration 
has been amply documented in the literature. EaP countries, with varying degrees, 
have sought to maximize the benefits of the relationship with citizens established 
abroad.11 From a purely narrow perspective of labour migration flows, diasporas 
provide invaluable social capital and information for potential migrants. Diasporas 
can also be active vehicles for investment as well as knowledge transfers. Diaspo-
ras can also become an actor in the political life of the mother country – witness 
for instance the recent controversies regarding the role of the US-Based and the 
Russia-based Ukrainian diasporas, which have taken opposites sides in a number 
of national debates, or the important role played by the Armenian diaspora in pres-
idential elections in the past few years. 
The approach to diaspora development in Armenia is described in greater detail 
in Box 1. As noted earlier, two of the EaP countries (Georgia and Armenia) have 
established ministerial agencies with a mandate to develop and encourage diaspora 
                                                 
11 Cf. Migration Policy Institute and IOM (2012): Developing a Road Map for Engaging 
Diasporas in Development – A Handbook For Practitioners in Home and Host Countries, 
and the ample references therein. 
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relations.12 The experience with these institutional arrangements is relatively new 
and thus difficult to evaluate, but presumably, if well aimed, these dedicated insti-
tutions may facilitate economic, technological and cultural exchanges. 
 
 
5.3. EU Approaches to Migration from EaP Countries 
 
As well known, the European Union and its member stated share responsibili-
ties with regard to migration policies, pursuant to the general principle of subsidi-
arity that guides the division of competences between members and European 
Institutions. Thus, the relationships between EaP countries and the EU are gov-
erned both by EU-wide initiatives, as well as individual country agreements, cov-
ering several aspects of the migration process. 
 
5.3.1. EU-Wide Approaches for EaP countries 
 
Table 11 displays in summary form the current situation with respect to EU-
wide and bilateral agreements in force for the EaP countries. As can be seen, at 
present the European Union has adopted different approaches with respect to mi-
gration management. The EaP countries are, like all others, subject to the existing 
directives on mobility and migration issues (Schengen, Blue Card, Single Docu-
ment), and will be presumably included into the ones currently not yet approved 
but already in advanced state of discussion (Seasonal Employment, Intra-
Company transfers). A further EU directive (Single Permit Directive), which was 
approved by the European Parliament at end-2011, and should be introduced into 
national legislation by all Member States by 2013, should provide a common plat-
form to address issues of portability for pensions, and access to public services for 
certain categories of legal migrants. 
In addition, the EU has launched a series of broad initiatives aimed at increas-
ing the economic and political ties between the EU and EaP countries, which have 
impacts also on mobility, under the various initiatives under the Neighbourhood 
Policy and Eastern Partnership Initiative. At one end of the spectrum, Belarus 
stands out as having no special provisions in force or ongoing negotiations on 
migration arrangements, although the EU has declared its willingness to revisit the 
                                                 
12 The State Ministry on Diaspora Issues in Georgia (დიასპორის საკითხებში 
საქართველოს სახელმწიფო მინისტრის აპარატი), and the Ministry of Diaspora of 
the Republic of Armenia, respectively.  
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issue as political developments may warrant. For the five other countries of the 
EaP region, several negotiations are underway in the context of the Eastern Part-
nership Initiative, a component of the European Neighbourhood Policy. These are 
likely to affect mobility and incentives to migrate along two main directives. The 
first concerns the simplification of visa rules, going hand-in-glove with strength-
ened rules for return of illegal migrants and institutional strengthening of border 
protection and migration management. The second, through the possible route of 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) might lead to 
increased economic integration, presumably better growth and employment oppor-
tunities in EaP countries, and also clarification of rules with respect to mobility of 
persons. The situation country-by-country is as follows. 
 
Table 11. EaP Migration Cooperation Framework 
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
General EU 
Directives on 
conditions of  
admission, 
rights of mi-
grant workers  
and rules on 
short-stay visa 
1/ 
X X X X X X 
Association 
Agreement Ongoing Ongoing 
 
Ongoing 
X (2010, 
ongoing 
negotiations)
X (2011, 
under ratifi-
cation) 
Mobility Part-
nership X (2011)
    X (2009) X (2008)  
Visa Facilita-
tion Ongoing
    X (2011) X (2008) X (2008) 
Visa Liberali-
zation Action 
Plan 
      X (2013, 
ongoing) 
X (2011, 
Ongoing 
discussions)
X (2010, 
ongoing 
discussions) 
Bilateral 
Agreements 2/ 
   
Social 
Security: 
LV, LT 
 
Social Secu-
rity: BG, 
PO, RM, LX
Employment 
Agreements: 
PL, CZ, SK, 
LT, LV, PO; 
Pension/SS: 
BG,ET,ES, 
LV, LT, SK, 
CZ, PO 
Notes: 
1/ Schengen Visa (Visa Code) , Blue Card Directive (Directive 2009/50), Proposal for a 
Directive on Seasonal Employment (under negotiation), Proposal for a Directive on Intra-
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Corporate Transferees (under negotiation), Single Permit Directive (Directive 2011/98), 
Family reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86). 
2/ Other than Readmission Agreements. 
 
In the case of Moldova, a Mobility Partnership agreement was launched in 
June 2008, and in 2010 the European Union began negotiations on an Association 
Agreement. By end-2012, twelve rounds of negotiations were held, and twenty-
three out of twenty-five chapters of the AA have been provisionally closed.  
Within this framework, in December 2010 the EU-Moldova Visa Dialogue Ac-
tion Plan on visa liberalisation was adopted. The EU’s Evaluation Report on the 
implementation of the first phase of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization 
(APVL) notes good progress (especially in terms of document security, border 
management and migration), but also the need for additional efforts towards pro-
gress in public policy (cooperation between relevant authorities) and the imple-
mentation of anti-discrimination standards areas. 
On the migration management issue, the APVL includes two phases. In the 
first, which was completed at end-2012, priority was given to consolidation of the 
legal framework for migration policy; adoption of a National Migration Manage-
ment Strategy for the effective implementation of the legal framework for migra-
tion policy and an Action Plan, containing a timeframe, specific objectives, activi-
ties, results, performance indicators and sufficient human and financial resources; 
establishment of a mechanism for the monitoring of migration stocks and flows, 
defining a regularly updated migration profile for the Republic of Moldova, and 
establishing bodies responsible for the collection and analysis of data on migration 
stocks and flows.  
The second phase now under way foresees actions with regard to the continued 
effective implementation of the EU-Republic of Moldova readmission agreement 
and measures for the reintegration of Moldovan citizens; effective implementation 
of the legal framework for migration management; maintenance of the migration 
profile and analysis of data on migration stocks and flows; implementation of an 
effective methodology on inland detection of irregular migration; provision of 
adequate infrastructure (including detention centres) and strengthening responsible 
bodies to ensure effective expulsion of illegally residing and/or transiting third 
country nationals from the territory of the Republic of Moldova. 
On the economic side, the EU has offered Moldova a new Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA), and four rounds of negotiations 
already took place, the last one in November 2012. The agreement will aim at 
liberalising Trade in Goods and Services beyond Moldova's WTO commitments. 
Migration policies will be affected by the DCFTA chapter on Trade in Services 
that in fact address barriers to market access and limitations on national treatment 
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across all sectors The trade in services negotiations also will address the move-
ment of natural persons, and the negotiations might cover the temporary move-
ment of natural persons for business purposes, as well as aspects related to the 
application of EU national legislation and requirements regarding entry, stay, 
work, labour conditions and supply of services. The DCFTA might also address 
and define the framework or the general conditions for the mutual recognition 
agreements of professional qualifications between the EU and Moldova. 
In the case of Georgia, in 2011, within the framework of the Mobility Partner-
ship Agreement, two agreements were finalized with the Council of the EU: one 
on visa facilitation and one on readmission. Both agreements entered into force on 
March 1, 2011. The visa facilitation agreement makes it easier and cheaper for 
Georgian citizens, in particular frequent travellers, to acquire short-stay visas for 
travels to and throughout the EU. A short-stay visa is a visa for an intended stay of 
no more than 90 days per period of 180 days. EU citizens have been exempt from 
the visa obligation when travelling to or transiting through Georgia since June 1, 
2006. In parallel, as customary with the adoption of visa facilitation agreements, a 
readmission agreement was also signed between the EU and Georgia, and admin-
istrative arrangements were put in place for its implementation. Negotiations on a 
DCFTA are also underway, and might affect migration-related issues in ways sim-
ilar to those discussed in the case of Moldova. 
With regard to Ukraine, negotiations on a new Association Agreement and a 
DCFTA were completed, but are now in suspended status pending ratification by 
EU member states. As in the case of Georgia and Armenia, a Visa Facilitation 
agreement has been in force since 2008, and negotiations on a Visa Liberalization 
Action Plan are ongoing. The recent heightening of political tensions between 
Ukraine and the EU has contributed to a slowdown in the pace of such negotiations. 
Finally, with regard to Azerbaijan, little progress has been registered of late on 
the negotiations for a possible Association Agreement, whose conclusion was 
postponed (Azerbaijan is not a member of WTO, which precludes negotiations on 
a DCFTA).13 
 
                                                 
13 The ENP Country Progress Report of March 20, 2013, noted that “Overall, despite pro-
gress compared to the past, Azerbaijan needs to continue its efforts in order to meet its 
commitments on democracy, including electoral processes, the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the independence of the judicial system. Negotiations on 
an Association Agreement gained momentum in September, following several months of 
little progress. The macro-economic fundamentals of the Azerbaijani economy remained 
largely positive but corruption continued to be an obstacle to economic diversification.” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-243_en.htm. 
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5.3.2. Bilateral Agreements 
 
Complementing the EU-wide policies discussed above, some EaP countries 
have been successful in concluding bilateral agreements with individual EU coun-
tries, while others are lagging behind. Of the six EaP countries, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia do not have any outstanding bilateral agreements; Armenia has only con-
cluded a series of bilateral agreements on repatriation of undocumented migrants; 
Belarus has concluded agreements on the social security of migrants with Latvia 
and Lithuania; while Ukraine and Moldova have developed a sizeable number of 
bilateral treaties with individual EU countries on matters such as labour condi-
tions, social security payments and benefits, migrants’ welfare, and other matters. 
In the case of Ukraine, employment agreements have been signed with Azer-
baijan, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Libya, Switzerland, and Vietnam. These agreements set the 
framework for cooperation, allowing people from one country to work in another 
country and putting the responsibility on the host country for accidents at a work-
place. Agreements with Portugal and Libya (2003) stipulated the mechanisms for 
employment, labour agreement clauses, main requirements from candidates, and 
so forth. The effectiveness of these agreements is widely questioned, however. As 
the Country Report noted, many Ukrainian labour migrants prefer or are forced to 
work under undocumented conditions, and hence the applicability of such bilateral 
agreements is de facto moot. 
Still in the case of Ukraine, agreements on pensions and social security with 
CIS countries and also with Mongolia, Hungary and Romania were based on the 
territorial principle (i.e. pensions are paid by the state of residence of a person 
irrespective of the place of his/her employment). Agreements with Western coun-
tries have been based on the proportional principle (i.e. each country pays some 
part of their pension, depending on their tenure in that country). The total tenure of 
a person is found by adding the tenure in each country which signed such an 
agreement. Such agreements have been signed with Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Portugal. 
In Moldova, in 2007 the government approved a template of an intergovern-
mental Agreement on Social Insurance, developed based on the European Conven-
tion of Social Insurance and according to general laws set by Regulation nr. 
1408/71/CEE on the coordination of the social insurance system for employed 
persons, independent workers, and their family members which have moved to the 
European Union. 
The intergovernmental agreement contains non-discriminatory provisions for 
citizenship or residence principle. The entitled person would benefit from pay-
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ments regardless of citizenship and even if he or she resides in another contracting 
state. The draft of this agreement applies to national legislations of contracting 
states in regards to the following social insurance payments: payments in the case 
of maternity and sickness, accidents at work and professional diseases, disability 
payments (pensions and allowances), old age pensions, survivor pensions, aids in 
case of death, unemployment aids. 
As a basic principle, the agreement requires the payment of social insurance 
contributions in one contracting state – namely, in the state where the migrant 
worker undertakes his activity. Other agreement principles are: (i) equal treatment 
of citizens of each party; (ii) determination of applicable legislation; (iii) sum of 
social insurance periods; and (iv) the export of payments entitles a migrant worker 
to benefit from payments gained in the states where he or she worked, on the terri-
tory of his or her own country (maintenance of gained rights). 
The Government of Moldova has negotiated and signed bilateral agreements in 
the field of social insurance with Bulgaria (2008), Portugal (2008), Romania 
(April 2010), and Luxembourg (June 2010). At the moment of the study, two ne-
gotiation rounds on similar agreements were organized with the Czech Republic. 
Many states, among which are Greece, Italy, Latvia, Austria, Poland, Turkey, Es-
tonia, and Lithuania, have expressed their will to regulate their relations in the 
field of social insurance and to sign bilateral agreements with Moldova. This in-
cludes Italy as a main destination country for Moldovan migrants with which ne-
gotiations are ongoing and have not been finalised. Due to the absence of a bilat-
eral social security agreement between Moldova and Italy up until now, Moldovan 
migrants in Italy have to rely on the provisions of the Italian legislation with re-
gards to the possibility for the portability and exportability of social security bene-
fits. In the future, the Republic of Moldova plans to extend the list of countries to 
sign bilateral agreements in this field, in particular with the main destination coun-
tries of Moldovan migrants. 
As noted earlier, the implementation of the Single Permit Directive could sim-
plify negotiations and provide a common platform for discussions regarding social 
security and other working conditions for migrants. However, given the partial 
coverage provided by the Directive (Pascouau and McLoughlin, 2012) it seems 
likely that supplemental bilateral agreements (either to cover categories such as 
seasonal or temporary migrants, or to clarify the rules for recognition of contribu-
tions to different pension schemes, for instance) will continue to be required in the 
future. 
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5.3.3. Assessment of Progress 
 
We can attempt to summarize the complex pictures described in the two previ-
ous sections in the following three observations: 
1. Abstaining from issues concerning EU-wide directives, one should note 
that the EU has (appropriately) adopted a differentiated approach to EaP 
countries, depending on country circumstances, the capacity to manage 
migration flows and other important considerations. But this customiza-
tion makes it difficult to see what indeed is the “EaP” approach: for some 
countries it might be difficult to perceive what advantages can be obtained 
by intensification of negotiation and institutional change. 
2. The country studies do find that even for the EaP countries with the most 
advanced discussions with the EU, officials and migrant stakeholders 
opine that the pace and breadth of “concessions” is inadequate, and cannot 
appropriately address the many issues regarding labour migration that 
have been highlighted in this study. 
3. The progress in bilateral negotiations on important aspects of labour mi-
gration frameworks (e.g., ranging from definition of workers’ rights, to ar-
rangements for social security and health benefits, to education) is very 
slow, and limited to a few of the EaP countries. While this issue is compli-
cated by the divided responsibilities within the European Union for such 
treaties (which must generally be bilateral), the recent adoption of the Sin-
gle Permit Directive offers an opportunity for substantial advances once 
the legislation in Member countries is conformed to it. There is still scope 
for the European Institutions to take leadership in areas in which the adop-
tion of standards could allow for progress at the country level as well 
(most notably in the fields of higher and vocational education). 
 
 
5.4. Russia’s Approach to Migration Management from the EaP 
Countries 
 
The current preponderance of Russia as a destination country for EaP migrants 
is the result of several factors, ranging from long-established ties dating back to 
the former Soviet Union, the presence of large diasporas, the knowledge of Rus-
sian language (now a waning factor among the younger generations in some EaP 
countries), cultural affinities. These explanations, however, are complemented by 
a rather liberal legal framework for immigration that the Russian Federation has 
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put in place over the years, and that can be distinguished according to two separate 
provisions: (i) rules for entry into the Russian Federation; and (ii) rules for lawful 
employment of migrants. 
With regard to the rules for entry, the Russian Federation has adopted and con-
firmed a very liberal approach with respect to members of the Commonwealth of 
the Independent States, of which all EaP countries bar Georgia are members. The-
se rules very simply result in the possibility of entry into the territory of the Rus-
sian Federation by citizens of CIS countries without the need for a specific visa, 
but rather upon production of a national identity card. 
Entry into the Russian Federation, however, does not imply right to work in the 
Russian Federation, and in this respect Russia has struggled with several ap-
proaches in the course of the last two decades, reflecting a debate that very often 
has contrasted the labour needs of the country with the negative perceptions of 
parts of the population particularly with regard to immigrants from Central Asia 
and the Caucuses.14 
The Federal Migration Service (FMS) published in June 2012 a new “Concept 
of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation through 2025”,15 which 
provides a set of goals, principles, objectives and activities in the area of migration 
policies, including internal migration. The “Concept” requires the adoption and 
implementation of several laws and even new institutions.16 It combines a set of 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of the migration policies of the Soviet Union and of the Russian Federa-
tion, see Irina Ivakhnyuk (2009): The Russian Migration Policy and its Impact on Human 
Development: The Historical Perspective, Human Development Research Paper, 2009/14, 
UNDP 
15 Концепция миграционной политики Российской Федерации до 2025 года и ин-
формация о ходе ее исполнения, http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/koncep_mig_pol/ 
16 “The Federal Migration Service, or FMS, has already published an action plan for the 
implementation of the first stage of the Concept. Furthermore, a number of draft laws have 
been actively developed as part of the Migration Policy Concept. In particular, these in-
clude certain legislative initiatives that require labour migrants to pass an examination in 
the Russian language and fundamentals of Russian law. Moreover, a draft law imposing 
criminal and administrative liability for organizing illegal migration is expected to emerge 
in Q2 2013. A draft law that simplifies the procedure for issuing residence permits to for-
eigners working in Russia over a lengthy period of time and introduces a scoring system 
for migrants will see the light of day early in 2014. This draft law will also introduce a 
simplified entry procedure and lift restrictions on work and study for families of those 
foreigners who have long-term employment contracts. Furthermore, by the end of Q1 2014 
the State Duma will consider a draft law simplifying the procedure for granting Russian 
citizenship to entrepreneurs, investors and qualified specialists holding residence permits, 
and to their family members, as well as to graduates of Russian educational institutions. 
Further developments anticipated in the middle of 2014 include an improved procedure 
for evaluating the need for foreign workers and designated measures for attracting foreign-
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objectives with regard to migration deemed desirable and to be encouraged (par-
ticularly, a program for repatriation of Russians living abroad, and a program, not-
yet entirely defined, to encourage migration of skilled workers), with the revamp-
ing of the system of labour quotas for unskilled and other workers, that has been 
often modified in the past. The latter system, affecting the large majority of legal 
migrants, is intended to respond to labour needs in different sectors and different 
regions of the country, and as many other administrative-intense processes in Rus-
sia, has been the object of criticism for alleged abuses and inefficiencies. Provi-
sions to fight illegal employment practices are also envisaged. 
As is the case with respect to many EU countries, in practice many of the la-
bour migrants from EaP countries are in a state of semi-legality, with varying de-
grees according to the occupations in which they operate. Migrants in seasonal 
activities (agriculture, construction) tend to engage in circular patterns, as docu-
mented for instance in the case of Ukrainian and Moldovan workers. Others, often 
engaged in trade and hospitality services, may have settled for a long period of 
time. 
It is thus difficult to consider the Russian approach “ideal” or one that could be 
easily copied by the EU, and as noted the approach to migration policy is in evolu-
tion at present. However, the separation of the visa regime issue from that of the 
modalities for legal labour migration bears keeping in mind, as does the empirical 
observation that, at least as far as EaP countries are concerned, a liberal visa re-
gime has not resulted in uncontrolled and unstoppable flows of migrants—rather, 
the situation, as argued in the previous chapters, has reached an apparent “steady 
state”. 
                                                                                                                           
ers to fill vacant jobs not popular among Russian citizens. Thus, these measures are ex-
pected to achieve the annual migration gain to a level of 200,000 people (fellow nationals 
living abroad) by the end of 2015 and 250,000 migrants by 2020.” Agrba (2013). 
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6. Conclusions: Policy 
Recommendations to Improve 
the Outcomes of Migration for 
the EaP countries 
There are several important lessons that emerge from the review of the state of 
play of the policies that can affect migration outcomes in the EaP region. These 
lessons apply, with different emphasis, to both sending (EaP) and receiving (EU) 
countries. 
 
 
6.1. Lessons and Policy Recommendations for EaP Countries 
 
General, macroeconomic and sectoral, policies affect the individual decisions 
to migrate and the potential for positive or negative outcomes. It is not feasible to 
list all possible ways in which these policies interact with migration, but it is pos-
sible to provide a general, methodological recommendation for the EaP countries 
going forward:  
A Migration Lens should be part of macroeconomic and sectoral policy formula-
tion 
This “lens”, i.e. framing policies with a view to direct and indirect consequenc-
es on migration should also become more important as the importance of migra-
tion rises. The need for an institutionalized “lens” is important, as experience 
shows that sectoral policy discussions very often are dominated by domestic con-
cerns and lobbying effort by different stakeholders, who may not be particularly 
interested in the nexuses with migration and its socio-economic effects. 
A complementary lesson is that: 
The Migration Lens needs to be implemented/facilitated by an agency empowered 
with sufficient clout among government organizations 
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These two recommendations imply that migration should be recognized as part 
of the national strategy in the EaP countries, and that this recognition should be 
backed by an institutional setting that would favour its effectiveness. National 
development strategies for migration-sending countries would be well-advised to 
take a holistic approach to maximizing the benefits from labour migration flows, 
but this requires the existence of a powerful advocate that can help mediate among 
sectoral interests and maintain the focus on the migration strategy and on the im-
plications of individual policy decisions on migration outcomes. 
EaP countries are also at very different stages in the provision of migration-
targeted assistance, both pre- and post-departure. In this respect, the EaP govern-
ments could learn a lot from international best-practice in areas such as regulation 
of employment intermediaries, pre-departure education courses in languages, sur-
vival skills, financial literacy, as well as consular assistance in countries of desti-
nation. Action in this respect would offer opportunities for joint work and collabo-
ration with the EU and its member states. 
Maximizing the benefits of the relations with the Diaspora. Diasporas form the 
EaP countries are very active in a number of EU member states, and have served 
both as informal social safety and informational networks for migrants, as well as 
purveyors of investment and knowledge towards the countries of origin. EaP coun-
tries have adopted very different models in dealing with the diaspora. We recom-
mend that EaP governments, with possible assistance from the EU, evaluate the 
effectiveness of their present arrangements and, as part of the overall Migration 
Strategy, proceed to upgrade where necessary the institutional commitments to 
Diaspora collaboration. 
 
 
6.2. Recommendations for the European Union and its Member 
States 
 
This study documents the ongoing array of instruments and avenues that are 
being pursued by the institutions of the European Union to deal with migration 
issues concerning the EaP countries. The study also notes the experience of the 
relationships between the EaP and the Russian Federation with regard to mobility 
of people and labour migration. In particular, it appears that visa liberalization 
would not lead to massive emigration. This is an important point to bear in mind in 
the present context, when much energy is spent negotiating the fine details of visa 
facilitation and liberalization between the EaP countries and the EU. The second, 
however, is that even Russia has not managed to find, despite its many attempts 
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and the clear focus on management of labour migration as a strategic objective for 
medium-term growth, a clear mechanism to reconcile the demand for labour (and 
of different types of skills) and the supply of migrants from the CIS countries. 
Many migrants from EaP countries live and work in EU member states irregu-
larly, frequently in problematic circumstances. National regularization pro-
grammes in several EU countries have already improved the living conditions of 
many of these migrants. However, as long as access to the EU labour market re-
mains highly restricted for individuals from the EaP region, incentives for irregu-
lar migration remain. The EU could consider, in the context of the Mobility Part-
nerships, encouraging member countries to start pilot programs specifically target-
ed for EaP nationals for access to the labour force in EU countries. Greatly ex-
panded legal employment opportunities in the EU would not only improve the 
living conditions of the migrants themselves. As we have explained above, they 
would also generate a positive development impact in the EaP countries, particu-
larly when combined with policy interventions that provide for pre-departure mi-
grant orientation, language training, and job placement. By providing a structured 
environment for labour migration, it would also be possible to avoid labour market 
disruption in EU member states.  
In the course of its present negotiations with some EaP countries, the EU has 
been conditioning progress in mobility arrangements to improvements in the legal 
and institutional framework in sending countries, dealing with migration issues. 
This approach is highly appropriate, and should be extended and provided with 
adequate means—as long as clear institutional benchmarks are clearly set and not 
seen as ways of postponing policy decisions on the part of the EU. 
A further lesson that emerges from this review is that the progress in bilateral 
negotiations on important aspects of labour migration frameworks (e.g., ranging 
from definition of workers’ rights, to arrangements for social security and health 
benefits, to education) is very slow, and limited to few of the EaP countries. As 
noted earlier, the implementation of the Single Permit Directive could simplify 
negotiations and provide a common platform for discussions regarding social se-
curity and other working conditions for migrants, which will likely require to be 
supplemented by other agreements (either to cover categories such as seasonal or 
temporary migrants, or to clarify the rules for recognition of contributions to dif-
ferent pension schemes, for instance). 
There is still scope for the European Institutions to take leadership in areas in 
which the adoption of standards could allow for progress at the country level as 
well (most notably in the fields of higher and vocational education). 
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